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Abstract 
 Since 2009, tensions have increased markedly between China and its maritime 
neighbors over disputed territories in the East and South China Seas.  China’s neighbors 
accuse it of acting like a bully, alleging that China engages in behavior that is aggressive, 
inappropriate, and oppressive.  But can such accusations be substantiated through 
objective analysis, or is bullying truly in the eye of the beholder?  Further, is China 
simply acting boldly, albeit in a manner that is justifiable, as it emerges as a leader in the 
region?  The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether labeling China’s behavior as 
“bullying” (as China’s smaller and less powerful neighbors view it) is accurate, and 
whether any definitive conclusions can be drawn concerning the assertive nature of 
China’s conduct.  Moreover, given how China’s neighbors perceive Chinese maritime 
policy, this thesis examined how the stability of East Asia might be impacted by smaller 
states’ perceptions.  A two-tiered methodological approach was employed that includes 
examining specific instances of conflict between China and its neighbors, and a content 
and trend analysis of regional media reporting on the disputed claims issue.  Ultimately, 
the ongoing territorial disputes between China and its maritime neighbors were used as a 
case environment for exploring how smaller states perceive and react to the actions of 
great and/or aspiring powers.  The case demonstrates that small states sometimes 
perceive themselves to be victims of great power behavior, whether or not such 
perceptions are accurate, and that the friction between great power conduct and small 
state perceptions can contribute to instability that endangers an entire region.   
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 Writing a thesis is no easy task, and I would be remiss if I did not express my 
gratitude to the many friends, colleagues, and academic instructors who advanced this 
work through their friendship, insight, and encouragement.  A few individuals deserve 
special mention.  I would like to thank Professor Suisheng (Sam) Zhao for guiding me 
through the complexities of Chinese domestic and foreign policy; the courses he taught 
on these subjects inspired me to learn more about this great and growing nation, and the 
knowledge he passed along helped provide a foundation for my thesis.  I would like to 
thank Professor Lewis Griffith for spending copious amounts of time, both in person and 
via email, interacting with me in the very early stages of this process as I struggled to 
identify a topic and develop a suitable methodological approach for addressing it.  I 
would also like to thank the Chair of my oral defense committee, Professor Doug Allen, 
for leading a lively and intellectually stimulating discussion that resulted in some 
valuable recommendations for polishing the final draft of my thesis.  Most of all, I would 
like to thank my advisor, Dr. Karen Feste.  Her sound advice concerning development of 
the topic, endless patience through all stages of refinement, and genuine commitment to 
my success as a student were absolutely indispensable.  Without her guidance, I would 
never have been able to navigate this challenging academic endeavor, and for this I will 
always be in her debt.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction ..................................................................................................... 2 
Background ..................................................................................................................... 6 
Outline ........................................................................................................................... 12 
 
Chapter 2 – China’s Contemporary Foreign Policy and Strategic Goals ......................... 14 
Core Interests................................................................................................................. 15 
Foreign Policy ............................................................................................................... 18 
Aspiring Powers ............................................................................................................ 24 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 28 
 
Chapter 3 – Bully Theory ................................................................................................. 31 
What is Bullying? .......................................................................................................... 31 
Who Becomes a Bully? ................................................................................................. 36 
Confronting Bullies ....................................................................................................... 41 
Victim Profile ................................................................................................................ 43 
Benefits and Costs of Bullying...................................................................................... 46 
International Bullies and Victims .................................................................................. 49 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 55 
 
Chapter 4 – Methodology ................................................................................................. 56 
Conflict Event Data ....................................................................................................... 58 
Media Content and Trend Analysis ............................................................................... 62 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 65 
 
Chapter 5 – Analysis ......................................................................................................... 67 
Conflict Event Analysis ................................................................................................ 67 
Evidence of Bullying Behavior ................................................................................. 79 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 89 
Media Content and Trend Analysis ............................................................................... 89 
Evidence of Bullying Behavior ................................................................................. 94 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 106 
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion ................................................................................................... 108 
Consequences of China’s Behavior ............................................................................ 112 
Limitations of Study .................................................................................................... 118 
Future Research ........................................................................................................... 120 
Final Assessment ......................................................................................................... 122 
 
Notes ............................................................................................................................... 124 
 
Bibliography....................................................................................................................150 
 
 
v 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
 
Table 1 – Characteristics of Bullying................................................................................35 
 
Table 2 – Search parameters for identifying media reports...............................................64 
 
Table 3 – Significant Maritime Incidents in the East and South China Seas....................69 
 
Table 4 – Number and percentage of Chinese media reports critical of China’s  
     neighbors............................................................................................................92 
 
Table 5 – Number and percentage of Japanese media reports critical of China................98 
 
Table 6 – Number and percentage of Philippine media reports critical of China............100 
 
Table 7 – Number and percentage of Vietnamese media reports critical of China.........102 
 
Table 8 – Number and percentage of Taiwanese media reports critical of China...........103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1 – Map of East and South China Sea Maritime Claims..........................................1 
 
Figure 2 – Public perceptions of China among selected Asian nations...............................4 
 
Figure 3 – Vietnamese demonstrator protests against perceived Chinese aggression.........5 
 
Figure 4 – Bully Behavior Cycle.......................................................................................38 
 
Figure 5 – Process Tracing to Analyze Conflict Events....................................................60 
 
Figure 6 – Number of Chinese media reports related to maritime disputes......................91 
 
Figure 7 – Number of media reports from China’s maritime neighbors, related to  
      territorial disputes.............................................................................................91 
 
Figure 8 – Editorial cartoons depicting China as a bully.................................................107 
 
 
 
1 
 
Figure 1 – Map of East and South China Sea Maritime Claims 
 
 
 
 
   Source: Strafor 2012, http://cogitansiuvenis.blogspot.com/2012/07/south-china-sea-graphics- 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
 Disputes over territory in the maritime regions adjacent to China’s eastern and 
southern coasts have fueled tensions in East Asia since the end of the World War II.  
During that time, relations between certain East Asian nations have been marked by a 
moderate degree of hostility as they compete for control of the region’s many islands, 
shoals, reefs, banks, and other geographic features.  The question of who controls those 
landforms and, more importantly, their adjacent waters, continues to be a matter of debate 
that shows few signs of abating.  On rare occasions, competition over territory has been 
punctuated by spats of armed violence, though in general, nations have exercised restraint 
over resorting to such harsh measures.  In the past several years, however, these long 
contentious, but previously manageable, disputes have escalated to an unprecedented 
level, increasing concern among world leaders that one slight miscalculation could turn a 
relatively minor incident into a full-blown international conflagration.  For example, the 
January 19, 2013 incident in which a Chinese naval vessel illuminated its target tracking 
radar to track a Japanese surface vessel and helicopter
1
 could easily have resulted in 
Japanese forces taking defensive measures that might have included the use of tactical 
weapons against the Chinese vessel.   
 The disputes over territorial claims in the East and South China Seas have 
evolved into one of the more pressing security challenges the region has observed since 
the end of World War II.  Moreover, the strategic significance of these maritime zones 
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for global commerce has sparked concern among international leaders; a major disruption 
in a region that handles half of the world’s maritime shipping traffic2 and one third of the 
world’s petroleum shipments3 would undoubtedly have far-reaching, adverse 
consequences for the world economy.  Although the escalation of tensions in East Asia’s 
maritime regions comes as a result of numerous countries’ refusals to back down in 
pursuit of their territorial claims, such as Vietnam’s claims over the Spratly Islands and 
the Philippines’ claims to portions of the Paracel Islands, the expansion of tensions is in 
large measure attributed to the actions of China, the region’s dominant power.  Several 
states, including Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan, accuse China of endangering the 
region’s peace and security by engaging in provocative behavior at the tactical level and 
by taking inflammatory action at the strategic level.  For example, Chinese vessels’ 
deliberate cutting of cables towed by Vietnamese survey vessels in the South China Sea 
has sparked anger in Hanoi;
4
 more frequent flights by Chinese reconnaissance planes near 
the Japanese-claimed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are irritating Tokyo;
5
 the 
establishment of Chinese military garrisons in the South China Sea worry Manila;
6
 and 
alleged Chinese attempts to interfere with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) efforts to calm tensions in the region have been viewed with concern by other 
world powers, including the United States.
7
   
 Moreover, evidence suggests that within the East Asia region, public opinion of 
China has been declining over the past several years.  Recent public polling conducted by 
the Gallup Organization indicates that perceptions among China’s maritime neighbors 
concerning Chinese leadership have become increasingly negative.  When respondents in 
these nations are asked whether they approve or disapprove of the job performance of the 
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leadership of China, approval ratings tend to be low, and in most cases the ratings have 
progressively decreased since 2010.  (See Figure 1.)   
Figure 2 – Public perceptions of China among selected Asian nations (Gallup Poll 
Results)
8
 
Question asked: “Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of China?” 
 
 
  
 Clearly Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, South Korea, and Indonesia all 
increasingly disapprove of China’s leadership over the past several years.  The most 
precipitous drops in approval ratings appear to have occurred in Indonesia (a drop of 30 
percentage points within four years), Vietnam (a drop of 17 percentage points over four 
years), and  Japan (a drop of 15 percentage points in just three years).  The decrease in 
approval among other nations is less pronounced, though the overall trend is downward.  
It is difficult to pinpoint from this data what is driving the downward trend in how China 
Approval (%) 
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is being perceived by its maritime neighbors.  However, it is apparent that the overall 
trend coincides with the recent escalation in maritime disputes.   
 What is certain is that China’s claims frequently conflict with those of its 
neighbors.  Although the maritime territorial disputes is an undeniably complex issue 
involving overlapping claims of numerous countries, China’s behavior feeds the 
perception that it is a bully in the region.   
Figure 3: Vietnamese demonstrator protests against perceived Chinese aggression in the 
South China Sea  
Source:  Information Security Biweekly, May 2013. http://biweekly.isvoc.com/category/south-china-sea  
 
 
 But is it fair to label China a bully?  The purpose of this thesis is to explore this 
question and to analyze Chinese activity in East Asia’s disputed maritime regions in 
order to interpret China’s conduct from the perspective of smaller states.  Indeed, China’s 
interaction with its neighbors provides a case environment for exploring how smaller 
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states perceive the actions taken against them by larger powers.  Three specific issues 
will be addressed:   
 1. Is China bullying its maritime neighbors? 
 2. What are the benefits and costs for China of behaving like a bully? 
 3. What is the impact of Chinese behavior for the East Asia region?   
 The first question requires an examination of bullying theory and an analysis of 
China’s interaction with its maritime neighbors.  Answering the second and third 
questions, which are admittedly more interpretive in nature, requires an examination of 
China’s strategic goals and its general approach to conducting foreign policy roughly 
since the time of Deng Xiaoping.  In general, major powers and aspiring powers have 
been labeled as provocateurs whose actions and assertiveness endanger everyone, and 
this is grounded on the assumption that strong states always exploit weaker ones.  But 
how smaller states perceive and react to the actions of more powerful nations is not the 
sole determinant for characterizing the behavior of aspiring powers.  With respect to 
China specifically, a fair assessment can only be made after considering China’s recent 
behavior in the context of contemporary Chinese foreign policy and China’s strategic 
aspirations.   
Background  
 In the East China Sea, the conflict between China and Japan over five tiny islands 
(known as the Diaoyu Islands in China, and the Senkaku Islands in Japan) stems from the 
late nineteenth century decision by Japan to annex the islands.  In short, Japan argues that 
it annexed the islands in 1895 at a time when no other country claimed sovereignty over 
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them.
9
  China disputes this historical interpretation, contending that the islands have 
always belonged to China and that Japan annexed them unlawfully.  The islands, taken 
into the possession of the United States at the conclusion of the Second World War, were 
returned to Japan in 1972.
10
  China began asserting its claim to the islands and the 
territory surrounding them in the late 1970s when armed Chinese fishing vessels staged 
nearby demonstrations.  Since then, the islands have been a source of constant friction 
between the two nations, and occasional flare-ups have occurred.  Most recently, in 
August 2012, in a move to prevent a prominent nationalist Japanese politician from 
exacerbating tensions by purchasing the islands himself, the Japanese government 
purchased the islands from their private owners and nationalized them.
11
  Japan’s official 
purchase of the island touched off a firestorm of anti-Japanese protests in China, 
culminating in attacks on Japanese property and resulting in some Japanese companies 
suspending their operations in certain Chinese cities.
12
  Although the  fever pitch of anti-
Japanese sentiment expressed in the late summer and early autumn of 2012 has since 
subsided, bitter feelings persist and tensions over the issue remain high even today. 
 In the South China Sea, merely identifying a historical starting point for 
determining sovereignty claims is a matter of debate.  A map, dubbed the “Nine Dash 
Line,” purportedly first produced by China in 194713 but never afforded much attention 
until the Chinese Communist Party reintroduced it in 1992,
14
 depicts the entirety of the 
South China Sea as belonging to China.  Other Southeast Asian countries dispute China’s 
assertion that the entire South China Sea falls within Chinese jurisdiction, and they cite 
maps drawn up during the Qing Dynasty in 1904 which depict China’s southernmost 
border as Hainan Island (located at the very northern portion of the South China Sea – a 
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far cry from the claims made by the “Nine Dash Line” map).15  But China has crafted 
responses to this as well.  In an attempt to refute other nations’ claims and to erase any 
doubt about who maintains sovereign rights to the region’s waters, the Chinese 
government has pointed to ancient maps that date back as far as the 13th century.  
According to Chinese government officials, such maps mention islands well south of 
Hainan Island, and China claims that these are evidence of its rightful sovereignty over 
the region’s vast maritime territories.16   
 Incidents of conflict between China and other nations over maritime territory have 
occurred since the 1950s, though conflict took on a new dimension in the 1970s as 
offshore petroleum exploration began in earnest and nations began to claim unsettled land 
features and their surrounding waters.
17
  Most frequently, incidents of conflict have 
included the occupation and occasional garrisoning of troops on contested islands, 
confrontations between civilian and naval vessels, the erecting of structures on disputed 
maritime outcroppings, arrests and detentions at sea, boat collisions, and the use of 
aircraft to intimidate ocean-going vessels.  In some instances, China and its neighbors 
have resorted to the use of force to settle disputes.  In early 1974, for example, Vietnam 
claimed the Paracel Islands of the South China Sea as a province of Vietnam, to which 
China responded by sending a small naval contingent to the area.  A battle ensued in 
which 36 troops from both sides were killed.
18
  An armed clash between the two nations 
also occurred in 1988 over Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands, during which Chinese 
gunboats sank a Vietnamese transport ship carrying Vietnamese soldiers.
19
  In addition to 
its occasional armed confrontations with Vietnam, China occasionally clashed with the 
Philippines.  In 1996, for example, China engaged with the Philippines in a 90 minute 
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gun battle over Capones Island in the South China Sea.
20
  Such clashes, however, have 
been rare and limited in scope, and although they have certainly contributed to tensions in 
the region, the disputes have ultimately remained manageable.  Overall, between 1950 
and April 2013, no less than 73 documented incidents of conflict have occurred between 
China and other states whose interests overlap in the maritime regions of East and 
Southeast Asia.
21
   
 Clearly, conflict and confrontation between China and others in the region over 
disputed territory is not a new development.  However, it is worth noting that the number 
of incidents of confrontation has increased since 2009.  Although the period from 1950 
through 2008 saw a total of 46 incidents of conflict, the brief period January 1, 2009 – 
April 1, 2013 has seen a total of 27 significant incidents.
22
  Several reasons may explain 
why the period since 2008 has witnessed an increase in such incidents.  For example, 
some China scholars argue that in the wake of the 2008 world financial crisis, many 
Chinese leaders were emboldened by the apparent financial fragility of the West, and 
may have interpreted it as an opportunity to advance Chinese interests.
23
  Consequently, 
Chinese leaders deliberately embarked on a more assertive approach to interacting with 
the international community.  China’s bold behavior in the East and South China Seas, in 
particular, presumably reflects this more general, assertive Chinese foreign policy.  
Without question, securing access to energy deposits located beneath the seabed is 
another factor contributing to an increase in the number of conflict occurrences.  
Geological survey estimates suggest that as many as 160 million barrels of oil
24
 and 290 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas
25
 are locked beneath the sea in these regions.  As home of 
the world’s second and third largest economies, and an additional number of rapidly 
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burgeoning economies, Asia has seen intense and increasing competition for these 
resources.
26
  However, identifying and thoroughly examining the overarching reasons for 
the ongoing maritime territorial disputes is beyond the scope of this project.  Rather, the 
purpose here is to analyze Chinese behavior in the disputed maritime regions in the 
context of bullying theory and to assess the consequences of Chinese actions.      
 Although in recent years there has been no loss of life related to events on the seas, 
there have been a number of recent developments that raise concern among those in the 
region and within the international community.  In general, the concern is that as a result 
of China’s recent policy, the heretofore seen pattern of low-intensity, occasional 
altercations between China and its neighbors may be moving toward a pattern of larger-
scale, regular, and potentially violent confrontations with wide-ranging and adverse 
consequences.  Fears persist about tactical level encounters quickly and uncontrollably 
escalating to strategic level crises.
27
  China’s increasing willingness to challenge other 
nations at the tactical level has raised concerns about prospects for regional stability.  In 
addition to concerns over the increasing frequency of tactical level engagements, 
concerns have been raised over China’s recent strategic level maneuvering.  These 
maneuvers will be analyzed thoroughly in a later chapter, but given their significance in 
shaping the nature of the disputes, it is appropriate to introduce them here.   
 In June 2012, China announced that it had granted prefecture level status to a 
small city called Sansha located on Woody Island in the South China Sea.
28
  China now 
claims that Sansha, a city of merely 1,100 non-indigenous residents on an island hardly 
large enough to accommodate an airstrip, has administrative jurisdiction over the 
territorial waters encompassing the Spratly as well as Paracel Islands.
29
  The unilateral 
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move to extend Chinese control southward into the South China Sea has been viewed by 
others in the region as an absurd Chinese attempt to justify its claims of sovereignty.
30
  In 
addition to upgrading Sansha’s status to the prefecture level, China established a new 
military garrison on the island.
31
  Although a small garrison of Chinese soldiers located in 
Sansha poses no real military threat to other claimants in the region, some still find the 
development disturbing as it gives China a pretext for claiming sovereignty over a larger 
swath of maritime territory.   
 In November 2012, the Chinese Foreign Ministry began issuing passports to 
Chinese citizens that depicted a map of China including the “Nine Dash Line” boundary 
enveloping the entire South China Sea.  The less-than-subtle suggestion of Chinese 
sovereignty over the entire sea was not well received by China’s maritime neighbors.  In 
Vietnam, border and customs officials were instructed not to recognize the new passports 
and to deny stamping them until a new visa had been issued and affixed to the passports.  
The new visas depicted a Vietnamese-approved map of the region.
32
  The move also 
elicited unfavorable reactions from the Philippines, Taiwan, and India.
33
 
 China has also recently been engaged in what many consider to be a policy of 
interfering with regional multilateral efforts to settle the dispute in the South China Sea.  
Certain members of ASEAN, as well as outside observers, accuse China of meddling in 
ASEAN affairs in an attempt to keep the organization from reaching a consensus on a 
Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.  Accusations have been made about China 
pursuing a divide-and-conquer strategy and wielding its influence over certain ASEAN 
member states in an attempt to fracture the organization over the territorial disputes 
issue.
34
  In fact, in the summer of 2012, for the first time in its 45 year history, the 
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ASEAN Regional Forum failed to reach an accord and was unable to issue a joint 
communiqué due to its members’ inability to agree on a proposed Code of Conduct.35      
 Most notably, perhaps, in November 2012, it was announced that the Hainan 
Provincial police would be authorized to stop, board, and search foreign vessels 
“violating” Chinese territorial waters beginning in January 2013.  The provincial police 
were granted authority to detain personnel and confiscate communications equipment of 
vessels suspected of “trespassing” in Chinese waters.36  This announcement raised a 
chorus of concern from the international community.   
 These recent developments, as well as a number of tactical level conflicts 
occurring at sea, will be analyzed to determine what impacts they are having on China’s 
relationship with its maritime neighbors.  Likewise, they will be analyzed to explore what 
the consequences of these actions could spell for China’s strategic, long-term aspirations.  
Whatever position one takes regarding these developments, what is undeniable is that 
China receives a great deal of criticism for its actions.  China is often accused by its 
neighbors of being a bully, muscling its way around the region, and attempting to 
intimidate those who dispute its territorial claims.   
Outline 
 In order to determine whether China is bullying its neighbors, to identify the 
benefits and costs for China of behaving like a bully, and to assess the impact of bullying 
in the East Asia region, I will take the following approach.  Chapter 2 is an overview of 
Chinese foreign policy, strategy, and goals since 1978, and briefly examines basic 
theories about the behavior of aspiring powers and power-transition states.  A review of 
these theories proves useful for explaining China’s recent behavior and for assessing the 
13 
 
costs and benefits of such policy for China’s greater interests.  Chapter 3 examines the 
premises of bullying theory, outlines the key characteristics of bullying, discusses how 
bullying occurs among individuals and groups, and identifies the typical consequences of 
the behavior.  Examining the premises of bullying theory provides a foundation for 
investigating how bullying applies to China in the context of the maritime territorial 
disputes.  Chapter 4 discusses the methodology used to analyze China’s behavior, 
consisting of evaluating contentious incidents occurring between China and its maritime 
neighbors at both the tactical level (on the seas), and at the strategic level (national policy 
level).  A total of 27 incidents are investigated occurring between January 2010 and April 
2013.  A content review and trend analysis of media reporting on the disputes in various 
claimant states is also covered.  Chapter 5 presents and analyzes the findings of the 
research that characterize China’s behavior and its impact.  The final chapter, Chapter 6, 
assesses the overall benefits and costs of China’s behavior for its strategic interests, and 
how China’s behavior impacts East Asia regional security and stability.   
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Chapter 2 – China’s Contemporary Foreign Policy and Strategic Goals 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to identify China’s strategic goals or core interests, 
and to discuss how China has pursued those goals in the 1978 – 2012 period.  In order to 
examine the costs and benefits of China’s behavior, especially in terms of its strategic 
interests, and to draw conclusions about the potential impact of China’s behavior for 
regional stability, it is essential to identify what those interests are and what China’s 
general approach to conducting foreign policy has been roughly since the time of Deng 
Xiaoping.  Understanding China’s interests and how China has interacted with its 
maritime neighbors and the international community during this period may help shed 
light on why China is pursuing its current approach with regard to disputed maritime 
claims.  Additionally, this chapter briefly examines the behavior of aspiring powers and 
the basic characteristics of power-transitions that prove useful for explaining China’s 
recent behavior and for assessing the potential consequences of its behavior.  The 
interpretation of Chinese foreign policy in this thesis relies on the analyses of Western 
scholars, including works by Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell (2012), David 
Shambaugh (2012), Robert Sutter (2012), Odd Arne Westad (2012), and Suisheng Zhao 
(2004-2012).  These scholars tend to agree that Chinese foreign policy from the Deng 
period until 2009 was marked by pragmatism, whereas a noticeable shift away from a 
pragmatic approach began to occur in 2009. 
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Core Interests 
 Every nation defines its core national interests, and a nation’s foreign policy is in 
large measure driven by those interests.  China is no different in this respect.  As a 
geographically vast country and a rising power among the community of nations, China’s 
interests are understandably diverse and have evolved over recent years as China’s power 
has grown.  However, China has maintained several key, fundamental “core interests” 
that have endured for the better part of the post-Mao and post-Cold War years.  In 2009, 
State Councilor Dai Binguo listed these core interests as: maintaining China’s 
fundamental system and state security, protecting state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and ensuring continued stable development of China’s economy and society.37  
Similarly, a 2011 white paper issued by China’s official Information Office of the State 
Council described these core interests in terms of state sovereignty, national security, 
territorial integrity, national reunification, sustaining China’s political system and overall 
social stability, and ensuring sustainable economic and social development.
38
  Taken 
together, China’s core interests can be summarized as follows:  
 1. Protect China’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 2. Protect and maintain China’s system of government. 
 3. Ensure stability for uninterrupted economic and social development. 
 For the past thirty years, the PRC has placed particular emphasis on economic and 
social progress --- a critical foundation upon which China’s other two interests depend.  
Economic modernization and social development are perceived to be the way for China 
to realize its potential as a great power and to command respect within the community of 
nations after having suffered through what it considers a “century of humiliation” at the 
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hands of outside powers.
39
  In fact, China considers economic and social development not 
only as a key to erasing a troubled past, but as a means for enhancing legitimacy for the 
Chinese Communist Party, thus strengthening the fundamental system of government and 
state security.  Likewise, China perceives economic prosperity as a pathway to 
strengthening its military capabilities and, hence, its capacity to protect its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity.  Overall, China’s three core interests, accurately described as the 
nation’s “bottom-line of national survival”,40 signal to the world what China considers 
absolutely essential for its existence and evolution as a great nation.  Moreover, each of 
these overarching interests have remained consistent throughout the post-Mao era, and all 
three have had a substantial impact on how China has conducted its foreign policy during 
this period.   
 China has made clear that safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity 
necessarily includes the question of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang Province.
41
  Events in 
each of these regions have routinely generated a good deal of international controversy, 
and China has consistently reiterated that it considers these issues as internal, sovereign 
matters not to be interfered with by outside nations.  Furthermore, China has indicated 
that it is willing to take action (i.e. use force) to protect its territorial interests in these 
areas.  Some China experts contend that starting in 2010, China added the South China 
Sea to its list of core interests,
42
 or that in any case, the PRC began treating the South 
China Sea as a core interest in 2010.
43
  However, others maintain that China never 
actually elevated the South China Sea to “core interest” status, and that this has been 
demonstrated by China’s (as yet) unwillingness to use force to protect its South China 
Sea claims.
44
  This contrasts with China’s stated willingness to use force to protect its 
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claims to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang Province.  (The question of whether China 
intended to add the South China Sea to its list of core interests arose during high level, 
private meetings between the Chinese Foreign Ministry and U.S. State Department 
officials in 2010.  The State Department eventually explained that the term “core interest” 
had never been used during the meetings, and that Chinese officials had used the term 
“national priority” to express China’s attitude toward the South China Sea.).45  These 
experts argue that the South China Sea is simply not on the same level as Taiwan when it 
comes to China’s territorial interests.  Nonetheless, Beijing has remained deliberately 
opaque on the issue, and has done nothing to dispel rumors that it might eventually use 
force to protect its interests in the region.
46
 
 In addition to economic, political, and security related matters, a number of other 
factors have contributed significantly to shaping China’s world view.  Demography, 
geography, and history have all had a substantial impact on how the PRC sees its role in 
global affairs today.
47
  At 1.3 billion citizens, China must manage a population that is not 
only enormous, but that is ethnically diverse, largely poor, rapidly aging, and highly 
concentrated in specific regions within the country.
48
  Such demographic characteristics 
create challenges for the PRC and place demands on Chinese leaders as they determine 
how to govern their country.  Geographically, the PRC is surrounded by nations whose 
governments, cultures, world views, and interests contrast significantly with those of 
China.  Arguably, China is exposed in all directions to instability and pressure, and the 
potential for conflict exists all along China’s periphery.49  Thus China has been, and 
continues to be, acutely sensitive to its border security; this is especially true in the north 
and along its seacoasts.
50
  With respect to history, China today is in many ways driven by 
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feelings of historic humiliation and wounded national pride.
51
  Scholars contend that 
China’s experience with national humiliation, having endured such abasement at the 
hands of outside powers beginning in the 19
th
 century, not only shapes how China views 
itself, but shapes its perception of strategic reality.
52
  China today continues to suffer 
from a sense of insecurity and vulnerability that stems from decades of mistreatment at 
the hands of outside powers.  This insecurity and perceived vulnerability is certainly 
reflected in China’s core interests, and it affects how China conducts its foreign policy.   
 Identifying China’s core interests and the factors influencing China’s world view 
provides an essential pretext for understanding how Chinese foreign policy has been 
conducted over the past three decades.  With these core interests and underlying policy-
shaping factors in mind, we now turn to a brief examination of how Chinese leaders have 
chosen to conduct their nation’s foreign policy since 1978.  
Foreign Policy 
 The death of Mao Zedong precipitated an end to what had been China’s policy of 
seclusion and self-isolation from the international community.  Under Mao, decisions 
regarding Chinese foreign policy were very much driven by ideology and often came at 
the expense of China’s economic development.  In the wake of Mao’s death, however, 
and with the inception of Deng Xiaoping’s market-oriented economic policies, a new era 
began in which the importance of ideology in making foreign policy began to wane.  In 
December of 1978, Deng initiated a pragmatic “socialist modernization” agenda,53 
launching China on a trajectory of rapid economic development that remains unmatched 
in modern history for a country of China’s size.  Under Deng, ideology had “lost salience 
to the motivation of pragmatic power politics”,54 and Chinese leaders began to embrace 
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an alternative, ideologically agnostic, “pragmatic” approach to guide foreign policy 
formulation and implementation.  Adopting a pragmatic approach meant that China’s 
conduct and pursuit of its strategic goals would be conditioned by historical experiences 
and the geostrategic environment,
55
 and not by ideology.   
 Beginning in 1979, Deng instituted numerous reforms that ushered in a new era of 
openness.  An official policy of “reform and opening” was announced, in which domestic 
economic and administrative systems were liberalized, and economic self-sufficiency was 
abandoned.
56
  As a result, China enjoyed newfound access to world markets, investment 
opportunities, and technologies.  Under Deng’s leadership, China began to experiment 
with a market-based economic approach, gradually introducing capitalist elements into 
what had previously been a closed socialist economy.  This period of opening up also saw 
China express interest in becoming a more active participant in global affairs and 
multilateral institutions.   
 As China emerged from its isolation, Deng also made it a priority to forge closer 
diplomatic relations with other nations of the world, particularly with China’s neighbors 
in Southeast Asia.
57
  During this period of normalizing relations, Chinese diplomacy was 
in large measure driven by the necessities of economic reform.  In fact, relations with 
foreign states were evaluated almost entirely on their potential contribution to China’s 
modernization.
58
  For Deng, the most important consideration for a China emerging from 
decades of isolation and economic deprivation was to modernize China and advance its 
economy.  Deng’s deep-seeded desire to see China catch-up with the rest of the world 
and to pull China’s hundreds of millions of impoverished citizens from squalor became a 
key driving force behind Chinese foreign policy.  Little else mattered, and to the extent 
20 
 
that relations with other nations offered an avenue for China’s modernization, Deng 
encouraged leaders of China’s Communist Party to reach out and establish positive 
relationships with China’s neighbors and the global community.   
 At the same time that China began to forge ahead as a more active participant in 
the global forum, Deng counseled China’s leadership to avoid getting ahead of world 
issues prematurely, and to avoid stirring up trouble.  Rather, he advised that China should 
remain focused on taking advantage of opportunities, bide its time, and gradually build 
power and influence.
59
  To move too quickly and to be too ambitious could be 
counterproductive as this would raise the fears and suspicions of other nations.  In fact, 
China’s leaders had good reason to worry about raising the suspicions of its neighbors.  
Many already resented China and viewed it as a threat given the PRC’s sponsoring of 
communist opposition forces in their countries during the 1960s and early 1970s.
60
   
 The premise behind adopting such a pragmatic approach was to foster a stable 
international environment conducive to promoting unrestrained economic growth.  In the 
immediate post-Mao era, Chinese leaders, mindful of China’s weakness relative to 
Western nations and to the United States in particular, sought to avoid confrontation with 
such nations.  A policy of defending the national interest by conducting a shrewd 
diplomacy requiring “rationality and calmness”61 became China’s preferred option.  The 
overarching goal of pursuing unmolested economic development was best served by 
ensuring a secure and stable international environment.  As such, a “periphery policy”, or 
“good neighbor policy”, was instituted in which China sought to keep or establish 
positive relations with other countries in the region.  Maintaining good relations with its 
neighbors would demonstrate that China was interested in maintaining stability, and this 
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was inextricably tied with China’s overarching objective of economic modernization.62  
Hence, as far as economic development was concerned, China should push full speed 
ahead with modernizing as rapidly as possible.  But China could afford to take its time, 
hide its light, and nurture its strength
63
 before assuming a leading role in world relations.  
Presumably, China would eventually grow strong enough to flex its muscles and take on 
a new role in global affairs.  But this notion was kept vague, and China’s expected future 
role was unspecified.   
 Deng’s eventual successors saw value in continuing the policy of keeping a low 
profile while nurturing strength, and of minimizing resistance to China’s rise by 
downplaying both its power and its ambition as much as possible.
64
  In the mid 1990s, 
Jiang Zemin set policy guidelines to “enhance trust, reduce friction, develop cooperation, 
and avoid confrontation”.65  Slogans such as “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” 
were adopted by Beijing, and hopeful if not gaudy language about countries of the world 
joining hands to “strive to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common 
prosperity” was communicated by government leaders.66  (Interestingly, the slogan 
“peaceful rise” was rather abruptly amended to “peaceful development” in order to avoid 
fostering the impression that China’s growth in any way constituted a threat to other 
nations of the world.).  Furthermore, China’s leaders made frequent efforts to calm 
international anxiety by publicly pronouncing that China had no intention of overtaking 
the international order.  “China never seeks hegemony” was a quote quite often cited by 
leaders in Beijing.
67
 
 Hence, heeding the advice of Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders carried on with 
their pragmatic approach to foreign policy, ever mindful of not being perceived to 
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threaten China’s neighbors or the existing international order.  Such policy persisted 
through 2008 and was remarkably successful in terms of providing China the opportunity 
to pursue its core interests and achieve astonishing growth.  Admittedly there were rough 
spots during this period, during which friction between China and its neighbors, and 
China and the West, was exposed.  For example, the 1989 incident at Tiananmen Square 
was particularly harmful to China’s renewed relations with the West.  China’s record on 
human rights and its alleged insensitivities toward specific ethnic groups within its 
borders (e.g. unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang province) strained relations between China and 
other members of the international community.  Furthermore, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait 
Crisis also brought to the surface conflicting interests and tensions between China and the 
international community.  Concerns about China as a possible threat to the region began 
to mount. 
 By the late 1990s, China recognized that in spite of its many diplomatic 
achievements, the set-backs it experienced had bred mistrust among China’s regional 
neighbors and tarnished China’s reputation with the great nations of the world.  Realizing 
this was problematic, and desiring to mitigate historical feelings of mistrust among its 
neighbors, China’s leaders launched a conscious diplomatic effort to strengthen relations 
with its neighbors and to improve ties all around its periphery.
68
  In 1997, in an attempt to 
mitigate the perception of a “China threat”, China introduced its New Security Concept.69  
Implementing this concept included stepping-up efforts to engage diplomatically, 
economically, and militarily with its neighbors.  This moderate foreign policy approach 
continued well in to the 2000s.  The period saw a decline in Chinese criticism of Japan 
and of U.S. security cooperation with other states in the region.
70
  China began to 
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demonstrate a new flexibility and willingness to engage in negotiations with the other 
claimants to South China Sea territories,
71
 going so far as to agree to a Declaration of 
Conduct (DoC) for the South China Sea in 2002, in which China pledged to resolve 
sovereignty disputes peacefully with other claimants.
72
  Likewise, China sought to 
establish influence with its Southeast Asian neighbors at the expense of the United States, 
attempting to build regional security forums that excluded the U.S.   For instance, China 
steadily increased its trade with ASEAN countries throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, 
having reached a trade volume of $41 billion by 2001.
73
  By 2010, that number had 
increased to $297 billion.
74
  The overall effort lasted until 2008 and has been described as 
an excellent and effective period in Chinese diplomacy.
75
   
 Nonetheless, an undercurrent of suspicion and wariness on the part of China’s 
East Asian neighbors persisted, and concerns over what China’s development meant for 
the region kept nations from growing too enamored with their large and ever-growing 
neighbor.  Indeed, in 2009 China’s leaders began to take a more assertive position to 
conducting foreign policy.  Contrary to what Deng had counseled regarding keeping a 
low profile and avoiding disruption with outside nations, Chinese leaders began to 
engage in sharp rhetoric and policy disagreements both bilaterally and multilaterally.  
Perhaps most prominently, Beijing became much more vocal about challenging the 
United States’ right to operate its military vessels in China’s 200 mile exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ).
76
  On three occasions in 2009, for example, China reacted to U.S. 
ships operating in waters near China in a manner that the U.S. Navy perceived as 
harassing.  In March of that year, a Chinese Bureau of Fisheries vessel harassed the 
USNS Victorious in the Yellow Sea by shining a high-powered spotlight on it,
77
 and later 
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that month five Chinese government vessels harassed the USNS Impeccable in the South 
China Sea.
78
  Likewise, in June of 2009, a Chinese submarine trailed the USS John 
McCain in the South China Sea, and was suspected of colliding with and damaging the 
sonar equipment the McCain was towing.
79
  Although this period of “Chinese 
assertiveness”80 and its accompanying diplomatic missteps did not result in irreparable 
damage being done, it nonetheless had a significantly negative impact on China’s 
relations with some of its most important regional partners.  In a very short period 
beginning in 2009, China’s relations with many of its neighbors (as well as with the U.S., 
EU, and ASEAN) deteriorated to uncharacteristic lows.
81
  Some scholars even consider 
the period beginning in 2009 as the most serious setback for Chinese influence in 
Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War.
82
  It remains a matter of debate whether 
China’s change of diplomatic course has been a deliberate, systematic attempt to exercise 
power at the expense of straining relations with so many countries simultaneously.  
Nevertheless, departing with the traditional method of conducting foreign policy (i.e. 
maintaining harmonious relations with other nations) unquestionably has had a negative 
cumulative effect on China’s diplomatic image.83  
 
Aspiring Powers 
 In order to better understand China’s recent foreign policy in the East and South 
China Seas, it is worth briefly examining what international relations theory has to say 
about the nature of power relationships between states, the characteristics of power 
transitions, and the behavior of aspiring powers.  Numerous theories of international 
relations have been proposed since the end of the Second World War, each seeking to 
explain the nature of state behavior and state-state interactions.  One of the more widely 
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accepted schools of thought is realism.  Advocates of realism (including renown theorists 
such as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Kenneth Waltz) posit that all states 
within the international system act rationally, pursue their self-interests, and that the 
primary concern of all states is survival.
84
  Although all realists subscribe to these 
underlying assumptions, in the past several decades two distinct sub-categories have 
evolved within the overarching framework of realism: “balance of power realism”, and 
“hegemonic realism”.85  Ultimately, balance of power realist theory proposes that high 
concentrations of power in the system are destabilizing, whereas equal distributions of 
power among states tends to contribute to peace and stability.
86
  Proponents of this school 
of thought argue that countries who enjoy a disproportionate degree of power will 
attempt to take advantage of their superior position to attack their weaker rivals.
87
 
 The other school of realist thought, hegemonic realism, accepts basic realist 
assumptions about the role of power in international relations, but rejects balance of 
power theory.  Contrary to balance of power theory, hegemonic realism posits that 
concentrations of power are inherently stabilizing and promote peace and stability rather 
than detract from it.
88
  As with balance of power theory, hegemonic realism also consists 
of several sub-theories.  Perhaps the most prominent among these, and the first of the 
hegemonic realist theories to develop, is A.F.K. Organski’s power transition theory.  
Originally proposed in 1958, this theory envisions global politics as a hierarchy of 
nations with varying degrees of cooperation and competition.
89
  It acknowledges that 
power arrangements and power distribution among states will fluctuate over time.  But it 
proposes that as states become more evenly matched in terms of strength, it is likely that 
relatively weaker states will challenge the status quo international arrangement.  In 1980, 
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Organski and Jacek Kugler published their seminal work, The War Ledger, in which their 
research reveals that as aspiring states approach power parity with an established power, 
conflict often ensues.   
 Organski and Kugler examine historical instances of power transitions occurring 
between major states and discuss how such transitions have resulted in large-scale, 
international wars.  Although their analysis is focused primarily on determining the 
origins, outcomes, and consequences of major wars,
90
 they nonetheless provide some 
insightful discussion regarding the expected behavior of aspiring powers and the potential 
consequences of their behavior.  A key observation is made concerning the link between 
a state’s economic growth, its national power, its behavior, and the potential for conflict.  
They illustrate how the extent to which a state experiences economic growth directly 
impacts that state’s level of national power.  An increase in national power, defined as a 
nation’s capacity to control the behavior of others in accordance with its own ends,91 can 
in turn be a key determinant of state conduct and, consequently, the occurrence of 
conflict.  In general, as the power of aspiring states increases and power among nations 
becomes more evenly distributed, the likelihood of conflict also increases.  Organski and 
Kugler demonstrate that this is so through their analysis of 19th and 20th century power 
arrangements, nations’ economic growth, and the outbreak of major wars.  Their research 
shows that changes in power structure within the international order, spurred by 
economic growth and associated competitive behavior by emerging states, is largely 
responsible for the outbreak of war.
92
 
 In their analysis, Organski and Kugler also discuss historic relationships between 
dominant powers and challenger states who desire to modify the existing international 
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system.  In short, aspiring powers are described as challengers who seek a new place for 
themselves in the international hierarchy.  It is proposed that challengers are states who 
have acquired power through economic growth, but who feel a general sense of 
dissatisfaction with their position in the international system.  Challengers desire to 
redraft the rules by which relations among nations work,
93
 have reason to believe they 
can rival or even surpass the power of the dominant state, and ultimately act on their 
desire to elevate their position in the prevailing system.
94
  Examples of this occurring 
throughout history include Prussia’s challenge to France in 1870, Germany’s challenge to 
the United Kingdom and Russia in 1914, and Germany’s challenge to the United 
Kingdom once again in 1939.  In each case, an emerging power overtook the dominant 
power economically (as measured by GNP) and challenged the dominant power’s 
position within the international hierarchy.
95
  The United States itself is known to have 
engaged in such behavior.  President Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine (which in 1904 announced U.S. primacy in the Western Hemisphere and 
established a policy of preventive intervention in the Americas)
96
 serves as a prime 
example of an emerging state challenging other powers within the system.  What 
Organski and Kugler’s analysis shows is that aspiring states’ attempts to redraft the rules 
of the system and alter their position in the existing international order usually results in 
conflict, and often leads to full-scale war.
97
  However, it must be noted that power 
transitions do not necessarily make war inevitable; Organski and Kugler admit that 
challengers may surpass the dominant nation without fighting it.
98
  
 Additionally, Organski and Kugler argue that an aspiring power’s challenge to the 
dominant power and the prevailing international system is a process that may unfold 
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gradually.  Power transitions may occur over prolonged periods, perhaps decades in 
duration, punctuated by isolated, lower level armed conflicts.
99
  Other scholars have 
come to similar conclusions, noting that aspiring powers posing a challenge to the 
existing order will seek to delegitimize the dominant power’s authority over an extended 
period.  The delegitimization phase may occur years before the critical inflection point of 
a power transition
100
 and may include the implementation of cost-imposing strategies to 
gradually undermine the dominant power.  Such strategies may include voting against the 
dominant power in international institutions, engaging in controversial uses of force 
against the dominant power’s partners and allies, and making threats against pivotal 
states that affect regional and international security.
101
   
 In sum, history suggests that as nations grow economically, they grow more 
powerful generally.  Hence, it is not uncommon for them to challenge the prevailing 
international system and to pose direct challenges to dominant powers.  With this in mind, 
China’s recent behavior in the East and South China Seas might be much less surprising.   
Summary 
 This chapter has identified China’s strategic goals, or core interests, and has 
discussed how China has pursued these goals since 1978.  In general, China’s foreign 
policy since the time of Deng Xiaoping has been focused on establishing conditions for 
China to pursue rapid, unhindered economic development.  As such, Chinese leaders 
have generally opted for a pragmatic, non-confrontational approach to interacting with 
other nations.  China’s recent, more assertive stance with respect to the ongoing maritime 
disputes is interpreted by many in the West as a departure from a well-established, 
proven, highly successful foreign policy.   
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 Moreover, the general consensus among Western scholars appears to be that 
China’s efforts have been largely driven by a persistent Chinese fear of falling behind the 
rest of the world.  The Chinese experience with what is considered to be a century of 
humiliation, a period during which China was weak and vulnerable, has contributed to 
China’s sense of urgency in its pursuit of power.  Contemporary Chinese leaders are 
determined to never again allow their country to be victimized at the hands of outside 
nations.  Hence, China’s recent behavior might very well come as a result of a persistent 
sense of insecurity.    
 Regardless of the underlying causes, China’s recent behavior tends to be met with 
pessimism and disapproval by Western scholars.  The general consensus is that China has 
been acting in a way that is not only unhelpful for the region, but that undermines 
China’s own interests.  While there is cautious optimism that China’s leaders will 
ultimately return to a moderate, pragmatic approach to advancing China’s interests, many 
admit that it is difficult to ascertain whether Chinese leaders will opt to pursue such a 
course.  For now, what is certain is that Chinese pragmatic foreign policy has contributed 
substantially to the remarkable growth and increase in power China has experienced over 
the past three decades.  What is also clear, as demonstrated by recent actions in East 
Asia’s maritime regions, is that some within the Chinese political establishment now feel 
empowered by that growth and believe it is appropriate for China to exercise a more 
assertive stance in the region.   
 History and a review of international relations theory suggests that given the 
extent of China’s economic growth and its associated increase in  national power, its 
more assertive behavior is not entirely unexpected.  But whether its more assertive 
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position is to be expected, how should China’s behavior be characterized?  The terms 
“bully” and “bullying” have been used recurrently by many in the region to describe 
China and its current maritime policy.  But is it appropriate to label China as a bully?  
Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to examine the theory behind 
bullying behavior.   
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Chapter 3 – Bully Theory 
 
 Numerous East Asian nations have concluded that China is a bully in the region.  
In order to determine whether it is accurate to characterize China in such a way, it is first 
necessary to understand bully behavior itself.  The purpose of this chapter is to explore 
bully theory as a pretext for better understanding China’s recent behavior in the East and 
South China Seas.  Sorting out the key characteristics of bully behavior, understanding 
how bullying occurs among individuals and groups, and identifying the typical 
consequences of bullying is helpful for assessing the extent to which China is bullying its 
neighbors and for understanding how China’s behavior impacts its interests and the 
region in general.   
What is Bullying? 
 Bullying is a worldwide phenomenon, and it has been suggested that it is a 
behavior rooted in human beings’ biological and evolutionary impulses.102  It is a 
behavior that transcends cultures and political borders; one might encounter it anywhere.  
Definitions of bullying and descriptions of what constitutes bullying behavior have varied 
over the years.  These definitions and descriptions continue to evolve as researchers 
endeavor to better understand the behavior.  How bullying is defined and how it is 
perceived is often contextualized; definitions depend on the participants in a given 
situation and the types of specific behaviors that are in question.
103
  History, time, and  
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location each contribute to the definition of bullying.  Thus, generally speaking, bullying 
cannot be regarded in strictly black and white terms.  There is rarely universal agreement 
about what bullying is or how it should be interpreted.  What one can say with certitude 
is that attitudes toward violence and aggression are largely shared across cultures, and 
that the general consensus on such behavior is that it is socially destructive.
104
 
   Literature on bullying contains certain themes that include: the intimidation of a 
relatively weak party, attempts to coerce that party, the intent of one party to exert power 
over another, the attempt to hide inadequacy, avoiding responsibility for behavior and its 
effects, and initiating action to induce fear, low self-confidence, and low self-esteem.
105
  
However, it appears it has not been easy to assign a specific definition to bullying 
behavior.  Some experts bemoan the inadequacy of a number of existing definitions and 
point out that attempts to define bullying is a highly troubled process.  To illustrate this 
point, consider this definition of bullying: “The willful, conscious desire to hurt another 
and put him/her under stress”.106  Such definitions are incomplete, are slightly misleading, 
and therefore are insufficient for capturing what bully behavior entails.  In this example, 
the assumption is that anybody who is intent on harming another is, by definition, a bully.  
Whether this is the case is questionable.  Although disruptive, it is likely inappropriate to 
label a single, one-time harmful act “bullying”.  Moreover, it is questionable whether a 
“willful, conscious desire to hurt” by itself is adequate for labeling one’s actions 
“bullying”.  The mere desire to harm does not necessarily mean that harmful action is 
occurring.  Rather, a willful desire to harm combined with a harmful act might be a more 
appropriate way to describe bullying.   
33 
 
 What is generally accepted is that bullying involves obtaining, through force, that 
to which one has no right.
107
  The common view also holds that bullying is behavior that 
injures repeatedly, over a span of time.
108
  Likewise, the behavior can be blatant or subtle, 
and can cover a wide spectrum of behaviors and responses.
109
  Bullying can come in the 
form of physical or psychological abuse, or a combination of the two.  Bullies might use 
varying degrees of physical contact to intimidate a victim, or they might employ more 
subtle tactics such as name-calling and social isolation.   
  Subject matter experts have offered numerous definitions of bullying.  These 
include:  
 1. Systematic abuse of power
110
 
 2. A willful, conscious desire to hurt another and put him/her under stress
111
  
 3. Exposure, repeatedly over time to negate actions on the part of one or more 
 other parties
112
 
 4. Longstanding violence, physical or psychological, conducted by an individual 
 or a group against an individual who is not able to defend himself in the actual 
 situation
113
 
 5. A special case of aggression which is social in nature
114
 
 6. Behavior which can be defined as the repeated attack – physical, psychological, 
 social or verbal – by those in a position of power, which is formally or 
 situationally defined on those who are powerless to resist, with the intention of 
 causing distress for their own gain or gratification
115
 
 7. Repeated oppression, physical or psychological, of a less powerful individual 
 by a more powerful individual
116
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The careful observer will note how certain themes (e.g. power, harm, repetition, coercion, 
and intimidation) recur throughout these definitions.  At least one, and in some instances 
several of these themes can be traced to the individual definitions above.   
 Also crucial to understanding bully behavior is the element of relative power, or 
power differential.  Researchers contend that bullying only occurs when an “imbalance of 
power” exists.117  In order for one to be bullied, the aggressor or group of aggressors must 
be more powerful than the party they are targeting.
118
  It is this power differential, or the 
uneven distribution of power, that contributes markedly to enabling the bully to engage in 
abusive action.
119
  Related to the concept of power differential is the absence of choice 
for the weaker party.  If one party lacks the ability to negotiate or exercise any 
meaningful choice, an uneven distribution of power results.
120
  This, in turn,  tends to 
limit the options of the weaker party and, consequently, facilitates bullying.   
 Assigning a definition to bullying also requires accounting for another factor: how 
aggressive behavior is perceived by the target, or victim, of the behavior.  Some scholars 
suggest that a sense of oppression is central to the concept of bullying.  As such, it is 
imperative that one take in to account the perspective of the targeted party and whether 
that party actually interprets the behavior directed against it as oppressive.
121
  If behavior 
is not perceived by the target to be troublesome, perhaps it is inappropriate to define the 
behavior as “bullying”.  At the same time, simply because a party considers itself to be a 
target of aggressive behavior does not necessarily mean this is so.  Occasionally there are 
instances in which one party engages in behavior that is misinterpreted by another as 
aggressive.  The targeted party’s sense of being oppressed is a necessary but not the sole 
determinant of whether bullying is occurring.
122
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 The foregoing discussion contributes to developing an understanding of what 
bullying is.  However, none of the definitions listed above, or the additional aspects of 
bully behavior discussed thus far, succinctly capture what the behavior entails.  Dennis 
Lines
123
 attempts to capture the essence of bullying in one concise definition by 
combining other definitions and related components of bully behavior.  He submits that 
bullying is “continual physical, psychological, social, verbal, or emotional methods of 
intimidation by an individual or group”.  Such a definition appears to coincide with the 
definition provided by the American Psychological Association (APA), which describes 
bullying as: “a form of aggressive behavior in which someone intentionally and 
repeatedly causes another person injury or discomfort (and that) can take the form of 
physical contact, words, or more subtle actions”.124  Drawing from each of the definitions 
provided thus far, the key characteristics of bullying can be summarized as follows: 
Table 1: Characteristics of Bullying (derived from multiple sources) 
 
Overall characterized by… threats or the actual use of violence 
Preconditions include… a power imbalance between aggressor and 
victim 
Aggressor desires… to enhance power 
to inflict harm 
Behavior is… aggressive 
committed intentionally 
repetitive 
Actions committed are… harmful 
unprovoked 
unjustified 
Consequences include… aggressor derives a sense of gratification 
victim suffers a sense of oppression 
victim suffers adverse physical and/or 
psychological effects 
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 The basic themes and characteristics of bullying having thus been identified, it 
becomes easier to consider bullying behavior in the context of state-to-state interactions.  
However, before examining such behavior at the international level, it is necessary to 
understand who bullies are, what the potential consequences of bullying are, and how 
bullying behavior can be confronted.  
 
Who Becomes a Bully? 
 Critical to comprehending the essence of bullying behavior is understanding who 
the bullies themselves are.  Who are the parties who engage in this destructive behavior, 
how do they tend to behave, and what motivates them to behave as they do? 
 Without question, a number of factors contribute to the development of a bully.  
Although researchers have identified a number of these factors, it is suggested that 
ultimately there is no way to pin down a definitive set of influences that contribute to the 
making of a bully.  Under any definition of bullying, the causal factors for the behavior 
may be complicated and variable,
125
 and most literature leans toward the notion that 
bullies are not simply born, but are created.
126
  The environment in which one develops 
appears to be the overriding factor in determining whether an individual becomes a bully.   
 Some researchers have identified two types of bullies: reactive and proactive.  
Reactive bullies tend to see the world through a paranoid lens, feel constantly threatened, 
view accidental incidents as acts of provocation, and believe an aggressive response is 
justified whenever such perceived acts of provocation occur.
127
  Proactive bullies tend to 
be more calculating about initiating harmful acts.  They tend to behave in a non-
emotional, controlled, deliberate manner, and are selective about their targets.  Proactive 
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bullies act based on deriving a sense of enjoyment from coercing or dominating a victim 
as opposed to responding to some perceived external threat.
128
    
 Bullies may engage in a variety of disruptive behaviors.  Some rely on physical 
violence to impress their will on others.  Such violence can be severe (e.g. beatings, 
kicking, choking) or less violent acts of intimidation (e.g. tripping and pushing).  Some 
bullies may use verbal attacks as a method of intimidation; name calling, teasing, rumor 
spreading, threats of violence, and spreading false information about a victim for the 
purpose of embarrassing or hurting one’s reputation are all tactics that might be 
employed.  Additionally, bullying can entail socially isolating the victim and 
manipulating friendship relationships.
129
   
 External circumstances can often impact how bullies behave.  Many bullies start 
out as victims themselves, and learn that their best defense is to be aggressive.
130
  Bullies 
tend to surround themselves with “friends” who look up to them.  However, such 
friendships are rarely meaningful as those who associate with bullies tend to do so 
primarily for fear of being targeted themselves by the bully.  Another trait common to 
bullies is that they have a dominant manner and cast blame on others for the unpleasant 
things that occur in their lives.  There is widespread agreement that bullies dump 
“seething resentment, bitterness, hatred, and anger” onto others.131  Other experts have 
identified bullies as those who tend to embrace belief systems supportive of aggression 
and violence, and who suffer from feelings of depression, impulsivity, and a reduced 
sense of belonging.
132
  Having said this, it must be mentioned that while many 
psychologists believe that those who engage in bullying behavior do so as a result of low 
self-esteem, more recent research suggests that this might not be the case.  Some bullies 
38 
 
tend to have very high self-esteem.  Further, such individuals tend to have a sense of self-
entitlement and superiority over others, lack compassion, lack an ability to control their 
impulses, and may have some difficulty with social skills that are positive or constructive 
in nature.
133
  Far from being socially inadequate, and although bullying is clearly 
regarded as an anti-social, aggressive act, evidence suggests that bullies retain strong 
social skills.  As such, it is perhaps most appropriate to describe bullies as manipulators 
with strong social skills.
134
   
 Bullying has been described as a very durable behavioral style, largely because 
bullies get what they want, at least at first.
135
  A review of the material examined thus far 
suggests that enhancing power is the ultimate aim a bully seeks to achieve, and that the 
bully is willing to inflict harm as a means to achieve this end.  The bully commits 
aggressive acts, such as coercion, intimidation, and the threat or actual use of violence in 
order to achieve his goals.  As his goals are achieved, the bully derives a sense of power.  
The process is ostensibly circular and self-reinforcing.  Figure 4 shows how the cycle 
operates.   
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  Figure 4: Bully Behavior Cycle
 
 But what drives bullies to act as they do?  The answer is that there are a number 
of possible motivators.  A brief examination of these motivators is helpful for better 
understanding why bullies engage in bullying.  Dennis Lines
136
 lists a range of behaviors 
that have been associated with bullies.  Bullies may display one or a combination of these 
behaviors. 
 
 1. Heartless violence: Characterized by a complete lack of remorse and feeling.  
 Individuals displaying this type of behavior lack anxiety, are utterly untroubled by 
 events  normally considered disturbing, and have the ability to kill in cold blood. 
 2. Strategic bullying: Characterized by a continual, systematic abuse of power.  
 Such abuse is not a single time, impulsive event, but a pre-planned and continual 
 act of harassment in which the bully puts down a weaker subject, humiliates them, 
 and torments them. 
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 3. Bullying for kicks: Characterized by deriving pleasure from taking aggressive, 
 hurtful  action against others, whether such action is physical or psychological in 
 nature. 
 4. Bullying for approval: Characterized by engaging in bullying as a means to 
 increase one’s popularity, to win self-approval (which is a trait hard-wired into 
 the human system).  Fulfills a desire to be recognized. 
 5. Impulsive bullying: Characterized by lashing out impulsively when annoyed, in 
 a manner suggesting that one has a limited repertoire of responses for dealing 
 with tension; acting without thinking, putting aside all other possible factors of 
 causation (factors that might explain why someone engaged in behavior that the 
 bully finds annoying). 
 6. Reactive bullying: Characterized by reflexive behavior which has no 
 preconceived outcome other than one which is primarily defensive; behavior 
 displayed when one has reached his/her tolerance threshold and reacts violently 
 out of pent-up frustration.   
 
 This list illustrates that bullying behavior is clearly motivated by a desire to serve 
oneself at the expense of others.  Given the selfish and harmful nature of such behavior, 
one might wonder what the consequences of bullying are and whether the behavior is 
sustainable.   
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Confronting Bullies 
 At the individual level, the presence of an authority figure is generally seen as the 
only effective way to address the imbalance of power between the bully and the victim.
137
  
It is questionable whether bullying can be halted in the absence of an authority who is 
willing to intervene and who has the power to dispense justice by applying sanctions to 
the bully.  However, it is suggested that while an authority figure can prohibit bullying 
from occurring, a potential drawback to intervention by an authority is that such 
intervention might actually increase the bully’s desire to continue bullying whenever the 
authority is absent.  Further, the intervention of an authority figure might inadvertently 
endanger the victim.  Bullies might perceive, rightly or wrongly, that the victim informed 
on them.  Consequently, the bully might retaliate against the victim as soon as the 
authority is absent.
138
  Moreover, in situations concerning a group of bullies acting in 
concert, intervention by an authority might have the unintended consequence of more 
strongly uniting the bullying group; as soon as the authority is no longer present, bullying 
will continue and may become more intense.
139
   
 The concept of peer involvement has also been suggested as a mechanism for 
exerting authority and for preventing or even halting bullying.
140
  With respect to 
childhood bullying, some schools have implemented programs in which peer groups are 
used to mitigate and discourage bullying behavior.  In such programs, referred to as 
“bully courts”, peers render judgment about the culpability of the bully or bullies, and 
recommend penalties for bullying behavior.  Hence, the use of peer pressure can be an 
effective method of deterring and diminishing bullying behavior, though whether it is 
42 
 
ultimately as effective as intervention by someone in a position of authority remains less 
clear.   
 Certain experts recommend that if an authoritative body of some kind does exist, 
it is incumbent on the authority to communicate openly and directly with bullies about 
the importance of treating others fairly.  Bullies should be made aware, in no uncertain 
terms, of the potential consequences of their behavior.
141
  The assumption is that bullies 
will curb their abusive behavior if they are aware that institutional monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms are in place, and that bullying behavior will not be tolerated.  
Likewise, positive reinforcement is suggested as a means to mitigate bully behavior.  
Bullies might behave less disruptively if incentives are in place for good behavior.
142
      
 A number of experts who have studied bullying in the workplace suggest that 
directly standing up to bullies is the most effective way to deal with them.  Victims are 
encouraged to take command of the situation, to exercise confidence, to project courage, 
and to be proactive in dealing with bullies.
143
  Naturally, however, effectively employing 
confrontational tactics can be hindered by the power differential that exists between 
bullies and their victims.  As such, victims are advised to solicit help from outside 
sources such as friends, family, and coworkers.  Victims also have the option of 
documenting the mistreatment they endure at the hands of their tormentors.  It is 
recommended that whenever possible, those targeted with bullying should prepare a case 
against a bully citing evidence of mistreatment.  Such evidence can then be formally 
presented to senior parties within the organization.  If a victim feels the problem cannot 
be resolved internally, they always reserve the right to take the case to the public.
144
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Victim Profile 
 While literature on bullying behavior naturally focuses on the characteristics, 
attitudes, and actions of the bully, it is well understood that no study of the behavior is 
complete without some level of consideration being given to the traits and actions of the 
victim.  An awareness of who victims are and how victims respond to actions directed 
against them is essential for developing a thorough understanding of bullying behavior 
and its effects.  Understanding the characteristics of victim behavior and appreciating the 
importance of victim perception is essential for analyzing any situation in which bullying 
behavior may be occurring.   
 To begin, much of the literature on bullying behavior reveals that many experts 
prefer to use the term “target” as opposed to “victim” in referring to someone who is 
subjected to bullying.  Their rationale is that the term “victim” tends to imply 
helplessness and excludes the power of hopefulness, whereas “target” leaves room for the 
notion that those subjected to bullying can still be empowered to stop it.
145
  For purposes 
of this study, the two terms will be used interchangeably.   
 A number of traits tend to define victims of bullying.  Poor social skills is one 
such trait.  These can include: appearing to be vulnerable (e.g. looking scared); being 
non-assertive (e.g. give-in too easily to the bully); having a tendency to act in a way that 
rewards, and thus reinforces, bullying behavior (e.g. cries when picked on); appearing to 
be withdrawn and solitary; and, occasionally being aggressive and annoying.  Most 
victims do nothing actively to provoke their tormentors; their helplessness, or sense of 
helplessness, does it for them.
146  Victims often suffer from stress, adverse physical 
effects, poor performance at school or work, or may be fearful of going to school or work.  
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Likewise, friends may turn their backs on victims for fear of also being outcast or being 
targeted by the bully.
147
  Occasionally, victims will pick on another person smaller and 
weaker than themselves, and target others for bullying just as they themselves have been 
targeted.  In such cases, victims may vacillate between being a victim and being a 
bully.
148
 
 Victims are generally lumped into two categories: passive and provocative.  The 
victim’s personality, passive or provocative, will affect the type of response one can 
expect to observe when the victim is confronted with aggressive, bullying behavior.  
Passive victims are generally submissive and respond to bullying behavior by seeking to 
assimilate rather than express any displeasure.  They tend to be physically slight, 
unassertive, and too reticent to retaliate.
149
  Confronting the bully is certainly not 
something a passive victim prefers to do.  Provocative victims, on the other hand, are 
those who tend to react strongly, even aggressively to bullying behavior.  Such 
individuals tend to be hot-tempered, highly emotional, and are likely to react hostilely 
when bullied.  In some situations, they may lose complete control in responding to 
provocation from the perpetrator.
150
  Whether victims are passive or provocative, they are 
generally ineffective in stopping bullying from occurring and often invite further bullying 
through their actions.  If they do not retaliate, they inadvertently reward bullying 
behavior and risk exposing themselves to constant harassment.
151
  At the same time, if 
they overreact they risk receiving continued or even harsher treatment from their 
tormentors. 
 Given that bullying behavior necessarily implies the existence of a power 
imbalance, all victims are, by definition, weaker than those who bully them.  Although 
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victims may choose not to respond at all to being bullied (passive response), or while 
they may choose to respond in a way that is counterproductive (provocative response), 
often victims will seek authority intervention to redress the imbalance of power between 
themselves and the bully.
152
  The type of outside assistance a victim seeks depends on the 
circumstances under which bullying occurs.  At school, for example, redressing the 
imbalance of power may mean getting teachers, parents, siblings, or older students 
involved.  At work, the victim may seek the involvement of management to address the 
issue.  In other settings, victims sometimes choose to address the power imbalance and 
associated bullying behavior by seeking authority intervention from suitable tribunals or 
courts of law.  Ultimately, an authority can put a stop to the bullying by applying 
sanctions, suspending, dismissing, or taking legal action against the bully.
153
  In extreme 
cases, the authority might even choose to use physical, forcible measures to address the 
issue. 
 Finally, one must not overlook the importance of victim perception.  As noted 
earlier, the definition of bullying depends largely on how aggressive behavior is 
perceived by the target of the behavior.  Dr. Denise Salin
154
 points out that when experts 
define bullying, the perpetrator’s intent is typically not part of the definition.  Instead, the 
subjective perception of the victim is stressed.  In general, the emphasis has been on the 
target’s own perceptions, as it can be assumed that many of the reported consequences of 
bullying, such as ill-health, reduced commitment, and decreased productivity, are 
strongly associated with the target’s own evaluation of the situation.155  Hence, whether 
bullying is occurring or not depends largely on how behavior directed at the victim is 
interpreted by the victim.  If the victim perceives actions directed against it as unwelcome, 
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inappropriate, and/or oppressive, then it is generally accepted that bullying is occurring.  
If behavior directed at the target is not perceived by the target to be troublesome, then it 
is less certain whether bullying is actually occurring.   
 Overall, the victim’s perspective contributes significantly to the definition of 
bullying behavior.  However, it must be reiterated that simply because a party considers 
itself to be a target of aggressive behavior does not necessarily mean this is so.  There 
may be instances in which one party engages in behavior that is misinterpreted by another 
as aggressive.  Some experts acknowledge that the legitimate use of power to persuade is 
a matter of perception and position.  Coercive action intended to be benevolent can be 
perceived as hostile and unwelcome, but such action, while interpreted as bullying by 
those subjected to it, remains strongly defended by those who initiate it.
156
  Ultimately, 
the targeted party’s sense of being oppressed and of being bullied is a highly significant 
and necessary, but not the sole determinant of whether bullying is occurring. 
Benefits and Costs of Bullying 
 Can bullying be in any way beneficial?  The answer appears to be yes, though 
only from the perspective of the bully.  Simply put, a bully’s coercive behavior permits 
him to achieve his goals.  A bully is able to attain and exert dominance through his 
aggressive acts, and this can result in access to social resources such as the power to 
persuade, increased friendships, increased popularity, and at the individual level, 
increased mating opportunities.
157
  Studies have shown that bullying is positively 
correlated with peer nominations of power, social prominence, perceived popularity, and 
peer leadership.
158
  As such, bullying permits the bully to derive some degree of respect 
from those around him.  To be sure, such respect results from harmful acts and is based 
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on fear rather than genuine admiration.  But the bully benefits from this nonetheless.  
Consequently, so long as the bully remains unchallenged, it appears he has incentive to 
continue engaging in aggressive behavior, and the bully behavior cycle discussed earlier 
is set in full motion.   
 The question concerning the potential benefits of bullying has also been 
approached from an evolutionary angle.  In considering the natural evolution of human 
beings, Volk, Camilleri, Dane, and Marini contend that bully behavior is often associated 
with positive outcomes for the bully in terms of growth and survival.  In a competitive 
environment in which resources are scarce and survival is the overriding concern, 
bullying can be quite valuable.
159
  In such circumstances, bullies are not only better able 
to acquire material resources, but they can acquire physical protection for themselves and 
their resources by building a tough reputation, increasing their position in a dominance 
hierarchy, and gaining allies.
160
  It is suggested that this, in turn, may help prevent future 
conflicts and may minimize certain costs such as physical injuries or loss of tangible 
resources.
161
   
 However, while bullying may derive benefits for the bully, the consensus among 
researchers is that the behavior is by-and-large costly, and even destructive.  Bullying 
behavior’s destructive consequences are most evident in the impact it has on the victims.  
Those targeted by bullies often suffer from severe stress resulting from persistent fear of 
being harmed.   Depression often results from repeated public shaming.  Victims are 
made to feel inadequate and worthless.
162
  Researchers debunk the commonly held 
misconception that bullying can be good for victims in terms of “toughening them up”.  
Rather, it has been concluded that bullying is abuse, and that the degree of pain the victim 
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experiences far outweighs any benefit derived.
163
  In short, the adverse psychological 
impacts of bullying on the victim cannot be understated.  
 In addition to the costs imposed on the victims of bullying, bullying can be costly 
for the bully.  Although bullies may derive benefits from their behavior in the short term, 
in the long term their behavior can be a severe liability.  Perhaps most prominently, 
bullies can end up being outcast by society, and especially harmful acts might be met 
with severe judicial punishment.  School age bullies, for example, are four times more 
likely as non-bullies to be convicted of crimes by early adulthood.
164
  Moreover, since 
bullies exercise control over others through instilling a sense of fear, the interpersonal 
relationships bullies maintain with others are often insincere and hollow.  Friends of 
bullies may be friends only inasmuch as they perceive their interests are advanced by 
associating with the bully, and only insofar as they seek to remain off the bully’s target 
list.  Over time, such associates may elect to avoid the bully altogether, resulting in social 
isolation of the bully.  Likewise, bullying can have harmful consequences for the bully if 
the victim chooses to take revenge.  Fried and Blanche refer to the “cycle of pain, rage, 
revenge”,165 in which a victim’s pain can lead to an outburst of victim rage accompanied 
by devastating acts of revenge directed against the bully.  In fact, Fried and Blanche 
submit that the enormous pain bullying can cause feeds a cycle that can transcend the 
level of the individual and can escalate into larger, even global-scale conflicts.
166
   
 In sum, although bullying may offer some advantages for the bully in the short 
term, the overall consensus among experts is that the behavior is harmful for both the 
bully and the victim.  A review of the impacts of bullying suggests that the behavior is 
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ultimately self-defeating and self-destructive.  When bullies engage in aggressive, 
abusive, harmful actions against others, they necessarily harm themselves.   
 
International Bullies and Victims 
 The foregoing sections establish the groundwork for exploring bullying behavior 
in the context of China’s relations with its neighbors.  However, before thoroughly 
examining this case, it is necessary to call attention to one important caveat.  Existing 
literature on bullying focuses overwhelmingly on such behavior at the individual level.  A 
great deal of research has been conducted on bullying among school-age children, and 
researchers have examined bullying among adults in the workplace.  However, it appears 
that virtually no research has been conducted on bullying behavior at the international 
level.  Admittedly, a case can be made that aggressive and harmful actions committed by 
one state against another has been adequately addressed in the volumes of international 
relations literature that has been published concerning state-state interactions.  However, 
while history is replete with examples of powerful states strong-arming weaker ones in a 
manner that could certainly be interpreted as bullying, current literature simply does not 
discuss interstate interaction in the context of “bullying behavior”. 
 Admittedly, caution must be exercised in attempting to draw linkages between 
two very different levels of study.  Extrapolating from findings on bullying behavior at 
the individual level and applying the results to the international domain is no simple 
matter.  It may seem a bit of a leap to draw conclusions about state behavior from 
observations made on the playground or at the workplace.  Naturally, interactions 
between states are inherently more complex.  The multitude of variables that impact 
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interstate relations complicates the process of drawing parallels between bullying at an 
individual level and bullying on a global scale.  Nonetheless, an exploration of bullying 
behavior occurring at the person-to-person level is warranted as it provides an 
opportunity to identify the fundamental characteristics of bully behavior.  Familiarity 
with these characteristics can certainly contribute in some respect to better understanding 
the causes and consequences of aggressive nation-state behavior.   
 With the aforementioned caveat in mind, it is possible to examine the research 
done at the individual level and apply it to state-state interactions.  As one examines the 
findings on bully behavior at the individual level, it becomes apparent that states, too, can 
exhibit many of the characteristics of both bullies and victims.  States that bully other 
states engage in behavior that is ultimately characterized by the threat or actual use of 
violence against another state.  As with individuals, it can be expected that for bullying to 
occur, there must first be a power differential that invites the bullying; states that bully 
others are expectedly more powerful than those they target.  Furthermore, as with 
individual bullies, states engaging in bully behavior do so in ways that are aggressive, 
their acts are intentional, and the acts are repetitive.  Certainly the acts are harmful, 
though whether they are unwarranted and unjustified is a matter often open to debate as 
states that engage in aggressive behavior often justify their actions as a necessary 
response to an action committed by the target state.  States might be perceived as bullies 
if they challenge the status quo and attempt to overturn long-established norms.  Unlike 
individual bullies, who are motivated by a sense of power derived from their actions, the 
motives for bullying at the international level likely transcend a basic desire to enhance 
one’s own power.  Certainly states seek to enhance their power, and bullying other states 
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might be one way to achieve that objective.  However, it seems unlikely that in today’s 
world, a state would engage in bullying simply to inflate its national self-esteem.  Rather 
than acting disruptively and seeking power for power’s sake, it is more likely that other 
factors (e.g. territory, natural resources, rectifying a perceived historical injustice) 
motivate aggressive behavior.   
 One might also find parallels between bully victims at the individual level and 
victims at the state level.  Certainly in both cases the targeted party experiences a sense of 
being oppressed.  A targeted state will likely experience adverse psychological effects 
from being bullied, and it may also incur various forms of physical punishment from the 
bullying state.  In either case, one can expect that bullied states will react negatively to 
the actions directed against them.  Unlike individuals, who may choose not to take any 
action at all and simply endure their misfortune, bully victims at the state level will likely 
respond by publicly protesting against the bullying.  Targeted states might even actively 
seek help from authoritative international institutions or other states to protect themselves 
from bullying states.   
Examples of Bullying 
 Whether bullying occurs on the playground, in the workplace, or on the global 
political stage, the fundamental characteristics of bullying (as discussed earlier) will 
always be present.  The following examples illustrate how bullying can occur at different 
levels of human interaction.   
Bullying at School.  Perhaps the most familiar form of bullying is bullying that occurs 
among children in a school setting.  The practice of schoolyard bullies picking on their 
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weaker classmates is a phenomenon that transcends cultures.  The case of the “bashful 
kid” or “different kid” being repeatedly teased and mocked by his peers is a story that 
most everyone can relate to.  In such instances, one or a small number of aggressors play 
the role of bully, while children acting as passive bystanders reinforce the bullying 
behavior by providing an audience for the bullies’ malicious acts.  Bullies may 
psychologically attack their victim by verbally abusing them, usually through name-
calling, poking fun at the victim’s physical characteristics or mental abilities, etc.  Abuse 
often elevates to the physical level.  The use of force, from physically removing and 
stealing a victim’s possessions, to mussing the victim’s hair, to pushing and tripping, to 
tackling and pinning, are tactics that are often employed by the aggressors.  The threat 
and use of violence, the intent to cause harm, the existing power imbalance between 
aggressor and victim, the enjoyment derived by the aggressors, and the often very 
apparent pain such actions cause the victim all capture the essence of bullying. 
Bullying in the Workplace.  Bullying among adults is perhaps most common in the 
workplace setting.  Although bullying at the adult level differs from childhood bullying in 
terms of tactics used (i.e. bullying among adults tends to be less physical and is 
predominantly psychological in nature), the overarching characteristics of bullying are 
still quite apparent.  Tim Field
167
 provides examples of the boss who bullies his 
employees.  Such a boss may engage in constant nit-picking, trivial fault-finding, and 
occasionally undermining an employee either publicly or in private by expressing doubts 
about his or her performance are certainly techniques for inflicting psychological harm.  
Bullying might also consist of a supervisor engaging in belittling, degrading, ridiculing, 
overruling, ignoring, marginalizing, ostracizing, or isolating an employee.  A boss 
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engaging in bullying behavior might set unrealistic goals and deadlines, or may change 
expectations at a moment’s notice in order to irritate an employee.168   
 Victimization in the workplace has few bounds.  Other tactics of workplace 
bullying include keeping the victim in the dark about important issues by denying 
information.  An employee might be overloaded with work, or work might be taken away 
and have menial jobs assigned as a means of inflicting injury.  In some instances a bully 
might steal a victim’s work, thus denying the victim credit for his/her labors, or a victim 
might be denied requests for time off even in cases of illness or family emergencies.  
Such tactics might rightly be labeled “oppression by management”.169  In such instances, 
the classic characteristics of bullying are all clearly on display.  The aggressor exercises 
power by repetitively inflicting harm on someone less powerful, unwarranted and unjust 
acts are committed, the aggressor derives a sense of gratification, and the victim derives a 
sense of being oppressed. 
Bullying on a Global Scale.  Examples abound of states bullying other states, and of 
states being bullied by non-state actors.  One example of the former is the 1982 incident 
between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands---an incident that resulted in a 
brief war between the two countries.  Although the citizens of the islands had been under 
British protection and administrative control since the early nineteenth century, a dispute 
raged over who should claim rightful ownership of the islands.  In an attempt to wrestle 
control of the islands from Britain, the Argentine military dictatorship dispatched troops 
to overrun the islands’ meager British garrison.170  Such action was taken in spite of a 
warning provided by the Peruvian Ambassador to Argentine naval commanders that, 
“Margaret Thatcher won’t let herself be bullied by a military government”.171  Indeed 
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Prime Minister Thatcher’s swift and harsh response, in which an Argentine naval cruiser 
was sunk and British Marines recaptured the islands in an amphibious assault, indicated 
that Britain would not tolerate what it considered unjustified and aggressive actions taken 
by the Argentine government.  The Falklands have remained under British control since 
the war’s conclusion, but even today tensions between the two countries remain high over 
the islands issue.  As recently as 2011, the Argentine foreign minister labeled Britain 
“bully boy thugs”,172 and in 2012 Falkland Islands administrators reciprocated by 
denouncing Argentina’s renewed “bullying” tactics by resurrecting the issue of 
sovereignty.
173
  Each side accuses the other of bullying and justifies their claims, in part, 
by raising the issue of power disparity.  Argentina accuses the more economically and 
militarily powerful Britain of bullying Argentina, while Britain accuses Argentina of 
bullying a tiny, weak island neighbor.  Although the issue is certainly more complex than 
a case of bullying on the playground or at the workplace, the key characteristics of 
bullying are nonetheless present.  Threats of violence, aggressive behavior, a power 
imbalance, and a sense of being oppressed and victimized are all evident in this case. 
 While the Falklands incident provides an example of states engaging in bullying 
behavior, not all cases of bullying on a global scale occur uniquely between states.  One 
need simply turn to the terrorism conflict between the United States and al Qaeda as an 
example of bullying behavior between states and non-state actors.  This case is similar to 
the Falkland Islands incident in that both sides claim to be victimized by the actions of 
the other.  The American perspective is that the U.S. has become the target of 
unwarranted and repeated harmful acts at the hands of al Qaeda terrorists, and that this 
must stop.  Likewise, al Qaeda laments that Muslims have long been victimized and 
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humiliated by U.S. policy in the Middle East.
174
  Each side claims that the other is the 
bully.  Moreover, assigning the roles of “bully” and “victim” is complicated by the fact 
that a chief bullying characteristic (the “power imbalance” between the aggressor and 
victim) is not as clear-cut in this instance.  Clearly the U.S. is a very powerful state, and 
one might wonder how it could ever be considered a victim.  But al Qaeda’s ability to 
attack the US with devastating impact using asymmetric methods means that the “power 
imbalance” is not as apparent as it might first seem.  What is certain is that in spite of the 
more complex nature of the interaction between the U.S. and al Qaeda, the characteristics 
of bullying are still very much present.  Threats and the actual use of violence is 
prevalent on both sides, as is the intent to inflict harm.  Actions are repetitive, and both 
sides view the others’ actions as unwarranted and unjust.  Likewise, both sides 
experience adverse physical and psychological effects from the other’s actions.    
Summary 
 The foregoing examples illustrate how bullying behavior can occur at various 
levels of human interaction.  The examples reveal how bullying behavior is characterized 
by both objective and subjective features.  To reiterate, bullying’s objective features 
include: a power imbalance between the perpetrator and victim; a desire on the part of the 
perpetrator to enhance power and inflict harm; the action is committed intentionally, is 
unprovoked, and is repetitive; and, the perpetrator derives a sense of fulfillment from his 
actions.  But bullying behavior is also characterized by the subjective feature of victim 
perception.  How perpetrators’ actions are interpreted by victims is a crucial component 
in determining whether bullying behavior is occurring.  With this in mind, it is possible to 
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more adequately examine the specific case of territorial disputes involving China and a 
number of its maritime neighbors.   
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Chapter 4 – Methodology 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data and present the methodological 
approach used to analyze China’s recent conduct in the East and South China Seas, to 
establish whether and to what degree China has engaged in bullying its maritime 
neighbors, and to delineate the consequences of Chinese behavior in the region.  Two 
forms of data gathering were used to conduct the analysis.  The first involved individual 
conflict events related to disputed maritime territory occurring between China and its 
neighbors from January 2009 to April 2013.  The second set of data consisted of the 
content of media reports related to the maritime disputes, and identifying trends in 
reporting on the disputes in China and in other claimant states.   
 An analysis of conflict events between China and its maritime neighbors is 
designed to identify evidence of Chinese attempts to intimidate or coerce its neighbors 
through the use of harsh and/or inappropriate tactics.  Evidence of actions to induce fear, 
to obtain through force that to which China has no conceivable right, to apply physical 
and/or psychological measures to pressure neighboring states, and to do so in a way that 
is repetitive and injurious to its neighbors would all be indicative of bullying on China’s 
part.  On the other hand, the absence of such behavior would suggest that bullying is not 
occurring.  Even more so, conflict event analysis is designed to examine how perceived 
victims respond to Chinese actions, as this is a critical part of determining whether 
bullying is occurring.  Noting how China’s neighbors perceive the actions directed 
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against them and observing how they have reacted is essential for analyzing the nature of 
Chinese behavior in the region.  If it is noted that China’s neighbors perceive the actions 
taken against them as unfair, unjust, and harmful, then this would suggest the presence of 
bullying behavior.  If, however, China’s neighbors do not express displeasure either 
through words or actions, this would suggest that bullying might not be taking place.   
 Analyzing the content of Chinese media reports, as well as the content of media 
reports from neighboring states, is also useful for determining whether China has 
engaged in bullying behavior.  Here too, a window is provided offering a perspective on 
the nature of Chinese actions as well as reactions from China’s neighbors.  Media content 
and trends in reporting originating from China can be examined for evidence of bullying 
which may include: the presence of intimidation and coercion tactics; possible bids by 
country leaders to avoid responsibility, hide inadequacy, and blame others for 
unfavorable outcomes; attempts by leaders to justify otherwise unjustifiable actions; 
attempts to apply psychological pressure on others; and, sustained, deliberate, and 
injurious actions directed at weaker parties.  Additionally, the content of media reports 
might offer some insight into the larger ramifications of Chinese conduct.  Likewise, 
analyzing the content of media reports and noting trends in reporting from media outlets 
located in neighboring states may shed light on the victim perspective.  Unfavorable 
responses on the part of China’s neighbors would intimate the presence of bullying 
behavior, whereas fewer unfavorable reactions may suggest that bullying has not 
occurred.  Moreover, noting how China’s neighbors are reacting in their media may 
provide a foundation for interpreting the more far-reaching consequences of China’s 
actions.   
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 Taken together, the two-tiered data collection and analysis seeks to provide an 
accurate and, to the extent possible, objective assessment about the character and 
consequences of Chinese behavior.  Ultimately, data gathered from the prescribed 
methodology will be analyzed in the context of bully theory, China’s contemporary 
foreign policy, and theory on the behavior of aspiring powers to determine whether China 
has engaged in bullying and to explore the possible implications of China’s conduct.    
 
 Conflict Event Data 
 The first method used to assess Chinese conduct in the East and South China Seas 
consisted of conflict event analysis.  The primary purpose of this methodological 
approach was to identify evidence of bully and victim behavior in China’s interaction 
with its neighbors.  Specifically, the approach was designed to capture evidence of state 
confrontation, of threats or the actual use of violence, of repetitive, harmful actions 
intentionally committed, and of victim behavior to include a perceived sense of injustice 
and oppression.  Overall, the approach was designed to help characterize the nature of 
China’s behavior in the region.  The approach was also used to unearth any information 
that might help interpret the broader impacts of China’s policy in the region.  The nature 
of the interaction between China and its neighbors may provide clues about the future 
state of affairs in East Asia. 
 For analytical purposes, a “conflict event” is defined as an incident in which 
China and at least one other state enter into dispute over maritime territory.  The specific 
behavior ranges from physical violence and the use of force, to diplomatic maneuvering, 
to the introduction of policies resulting in friction between China and other nations.  
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Clashes at sea, incidents resulting in a harsh exchange of rhetoric between China and 
other nations, and implementation of policies that lead to public outcries and diplomatic 
protests are some examples of such incidents.  Conflict event data were gathered from 
various news agencies’ internet websites and from organizations devoted to tracking 
developments in Asia’s disputed maritime zones.  For example, the Center for a New 
American Security regularly posts information related to territorial disputes in East Asia’s 
maritime regions and was particularly helpful for identifying specific conflict events 
involving China and neighboring nations.  I selected January 1, 2009 as the starting point 
for my analysis since, as we have already seen, it was approximately at this point that an 
apparent shift occurred in Chinese foreign policy away from its historical, non-
confrontational approach toward a deliberately more assertive approach.  I included 
conflict events occurring through the end of March 2013, which appeared to be a logical 
termination point for the analysis given that China underwent a transition of national 
leadership during that month.   
 Conflict event data include incidents between China and East Asian nations that 
share a body of water: Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam.  Overall, I pinpointed a total of 27 conflict events that were 
significant based on the notable levels of media attention they generated, an appreciable 
degree of controversy involved, and discernible consequences of the incidents.  I 
analyzed each of these events in terms of who initiated the action, the nature of the action 
taken by the initiator, the intended target of the action, and the target’s reaction (the 
immediate effects of the initial action).  My analysis is illustrated by the basic process 
model depicted in Figure 5 below. 
60 
 
Figure 5 – Process Tracing to Analyze Conflict Events 
 
 
 Admittedly, for every event analyzed, both parties to the conflict blame the other 
for having initiated the dispute.  For example, China often cites its historical ties to the 
South China Sea, and blames the Philippines and Vietnam for initiating conflicts by 
engaging in activities there and failing to recognize China’s historical claims.  As such, 
identifying the “initiator” of any given conflict event relies to some extent on subjective 
decision-making.  However, in order to remain as objective as possible, I based my 
determination of who initiated each conflict event not on historical claims, but on recent 
developments that appeared to be outside the norm of usual events.  Atypical action was 
generally considered an indicator of initiation.  An example of atypical action would 
include a scenario in which a nation operating its vessels without incident for some time 
in a specific part of the South China Sea is suddenly ordered by another nation to halt its 
activities and withdraw its vessels.  In this case, the order to withdraw would be 
considered outside the norm of usual events, and the nation giving this order would be 
considered the initiator.   
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 After identifying both the initiators and apparent targets of each conflict event, 
specific attention was paid to target country reactions. In order to maximize objectivity in 
analyzing the data, I chose to focus as much as possible on official government reactions 
as opposed to more general, public reactions as reported in the media.  Targeted country 
reactions, elicited from the initiator’s original actions, were identified by conducting 
thorough online searches of official government websites as well as websites of reputable 
media organizations.  For each event, at least two sources listed the event, and in some 
instances as many as six sources listed the event.  For example, nations’ foreign ministry 
websites and government web portals often provided original source, official government 
reactions to specific events.  Media outlets also occasionally ran reports in which official 
government responses were provided.  Official government reactions consisted of written 
statements, comments made by high ranking officials or spokespersons during press 
briefings, and transcripts of speeches given by government leaders.  By examining 
official government reactions, it was possible to gain insight into the victim’s perspective 
of each conflict event.  This, in turn, proved valuable for characterizing the nature of the 
initiator’s behavior.  Specifically, it proved useful for determining whether the initiator’s 
behavior can accurately be characterized as bullying.  Further, official government 
reactions provided clues about the broader implications of the initiator’s actions.  Tying 
specific target reactions to distinct follow-on effects proved difficult.  However, taken in 
sum, the targets’ reactions provide a basis for interpreting events that occur after each 
original conflict event.  As such, the analysis permits one to draw linkages between 
initiator actions, targets’ immediate reactions, and events occurring some time later.   
62 
 
Media Content and Trend Analysis 
 In addition to analyzing individual conflict events to assess China’s behavior and 
its effects, I conducted a review of media reports to identify how the maritime claims 
issue has been addressed in the media of various claimant states.  Specifically, I 
investigated the extent to which maritime territorial disputes between China and its 
neighbors have received media attention in all countries directly involved in the disputes.  
In addition, I examined the content of individual media reports, noting the tone with 
which the issue was addressed in each report.  The purpose here was to determine 
whether the number and content of media reports regarding maritime claims issues 
reveals any evidence of bullying behavior committed by China.  The presumption was 
that a review of media content and trends would, at a minimum, offer insight into the 
victim perspective.  Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, media content analysis 
might provide insight about the broader implications of China’s maritime policy in East 
Asia; this methodological approach could be useful for interpreting how Chinese policy 
in the region impacts the future for China as well as for the entire region.     
 My examination includes surveying the content of reports from select news 
services in Brunei, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Vietnam.  Analysis was conducted by accessing the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) Open Source Center media database, which offers a collection of news 
reports produced by media outlets from around the world, translated into English.  My 
method of analysis included selecting one of the most prominent print media sources 
from each country, and recording the extent of coverage these sources dedicated to the 
disputed claims issue.  The selected news sources for each country were as follows: 
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Brunei (The Brunei Times), China (Xinhua), Indonesia (Kompas), Japan, (Asahi 
Shimbun), Malaysia (The Star), the Philippines (Philippine Star), South Korea (Chosun 
Ilbo), Taiwan (Taipei Times), and Vietnam (Vietnam News Agency).  These sources 
were selected based on their high in-country level of readership and popularity 
ranking.
175
   
 I chose to limit my searches to a single prominent print media source for each 
country as opposed to searching all possible media sources within that country (i.e. other 
print publications, television, radio, and internet sources) for two reasons.  First, the sheer 
number of media reports provided when searching across all possible media sources 
would have made examining them all a daunting task for a single researcher.  In some 
cases, my search using a single media source for each country produced well over several 
hundred search results.  Sifting through each of these media reports to determine whether 
they were relevant proved to be a rather laborious task.  Second, if I had searched more 
than a single media source for each country, I might have encountered repetition of 
original reporting.  For example, a topic originally reported in one print publication might 
very likely have been picked up by another print publication, or by television, radio, and 
internet media outlets.  Thus, I would have risked counting unoriginal reports, thereby 
skewing the results of the analysis.    
 The Open Source Center’s media database permits a researcher to conduct 
advanced searches on specific topics of interest.  The database allows users to select a 
specific country, time frame, media source, and key words or phrases.  Table 2 shows the 
specific search parameters I used for individual countries.   
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Table 2: Search parameters for identifying media reports 
 
Country Source Dates Key 
Words/Terms 
Brunei “Brunei Times” 1/1/92 – 12/31/12 “south china sea” 
China “Xinhua” 1/1/92 – 12/31/12 “south china sea” 
or 
“east china sea” or 
“diaoyu” or 
“senkaku” 
Indonesia “Kompas” 1/1/92 – 12/31/12 “south china sea” 
or “spratly” or 
“dispute” 
Japan “Asahi” 1/1/92 – 12/31/12 “east china sea” or 
“senkaku” 
Malaysia “Star” 1/1/92 – 12/31/12 “south china sea” 
or “spratly” or 
“paracel” and 
“china” 
Philippines “Philstar” 1/1/92 – 12/31/12 “south china sea” 
South Korea “Chosun” 1/1/92 – 12/31/12 “yellow sea” or 
“east china sea” 
and “china” 
Taiwan “Taipei Times” 1/1/92 – 12/31/12 “south china sea” 
or “east china sea” 
Vietnam “Vietnam News” 1/1/92 – 12/31/12 “south china sea” 
 
 
 As Table 2 indicates, I originally set the timeframe for each search as January 1, 
1992 to December 31, 2012.  This timeframe was selected since it provides a sufficient 
period of time over which media trends can be tracked and any significant changes in 
trends can be noted.  (Note: Unlike the conflict event analysis portion of the research, I 
did not include the first few months of 2013 for the media content and trend analysis 
portion of the research.  Since tracking trends on an annual basis requires a full-year’s 
worth of data, it would have been inappropriate to include media data for a mere portion 
of 2013.)  After conducting an initial search for each country, I combed through the 
results to ensure that only relevant reports would be included in the analysis.  For 
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example, if the search for Japanese media reports returned an article that mentioned the 
East China Sea in a context completely unrelated to China and the maritime disputes, I 
discarded the report.  Those articles addressing the disputes and China’s role in them 
were counted as relevant.  For example, articles addressing the following topics were 
counted as relevant: alleged sovereignty violations, continental shelf disputes, 
government pronouncements related to the disputes, jurisdictional claims, ship and 
airborne patrols of disputed areas, natural resource surveying, suggested methods of 
cooperating to resolve the disputes, actions taken to stake claims or build a legal basis for 
making claims, etc.  In this manner, I created lists of relevant media reports for each 
country, and I noted the number of reports published for each year through 2012.   
 After generating lists for each country and recording the overall number of reports, 
I reviewed the content of each report.  For articles generated in countries other than China, 
I noted whether the reports depicted China in a negative context, or whether the tone 
expressed regarding Chinese policy was more cautious or benign.  For reports derived 
from within China, I noted whether each report expressed displeasure with the actions of 
neighboring nations, or whether the sentiments expressed were more moderate.  For each 
country analyzed, I noted the percentage of “negative” (i.e. critical, disapproving, or 
accusatory) media reports.  Conclusions about China’s behavior and the consequences of 
its behavior were then based on the number and content of these negative media reports. 
 
Summary 
 Conflict event analysis and media content and trend analysis help to characterize 
China’s recent behavior in the context of bully theory.  Moreover, this dual methodology 
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helps identify potential consequences of China’s policy.  To reiterate, the primary 
purpose of conflict event analysis is to illustrate how nations in the region have 
conducted themselves and how they have responded to each other’s actions.  The purpose 
of examining the content of media reports and noting trends in reporting is to determine 
whether such information might be useful for characterizing China’s behavior (i.e. to 
determine whether there is evidence of China bullying its neighbors), and to discover 
what the broader implications of China’s policy might be (i.e. how that policy affects 
China as well as the entire region).   
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Chapter 5 – Analysis 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is to present the overall findings of the research in 
order to accurately characterize Chinese behavior and to identify its consequences.  The 
chapter begins by introducing the 27 recent conflict events occurring in the East and 
South China Seas that are significant for determining whether China has bullied its 
neighbors.  Each event was dissected into four key components: the event initiator, the 
action taken by the initiator, the targeted party, and the targeted party’s reaction.  The 
events were then analyzed for evidence of bullying behavior.  Following the analysis and 
discussion of these 27 conflict events, findings are presented from the media content and 
trend analysis portion of the research.  Observations made during this phase of the 
research were analyzed to uncover evidence of bullying behavior and to identify possible 
consequences of such behavior.     
 
Conflict Event Analysis 
 An analysis of conflict events was informative in terms of identifying specific 
instances in which China initiated action against other countries.  Ultimately, I identified 
China as the initiator in 25 of the 27 conflict events observed.  Although China would in 
each case consider its actions to be justified responses to the actions of other nations, and 
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while recent flare-ups stem from disputes that admittedly have been ongoing for some 
time, I concluded that China was the initiator in 25 of the observed instances given that 
no recent, discernible action was taken by the other parties to provoke China.  Table 3, 
beginning on the next page, depicts a summarized version of the data gathered for each 
event. 
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Table 3 – Significant Maritime Incidents in the East and South China Seas (January 1, 2009 – March 31, 2013)  
 
Date Initiator Action Target(s) Target Reaction Sources 
Apr 22, 2010 China Conducts anti-submarine warfare 
exercise near Japan; 
8 destroyers, 2 submarines transit 
through Miyako Strait; 
Helicopter flies close to Japanese 
Coast Guard vessel 
Japan Lodges formal diplomatic protest; 
Defense Minister expresses 
displeasure that Japan wasn't 
notified in advance of passage of 
such a large naval contingent 
Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 
Asia Times 
May 3, 2010 China Warns Japanese Coast Guard vessel 
against conducting survey 
Japan Lodges formal diplomatic protest Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
May-July 2010 China Seizes several Indonesian fishing 
vessels using armed Fisheries 
Management vessels; 
Accuses Indonesian vessels of illegal 
fishing  
Indonesia Confronts Chinese vessels; 
No official government reaction; 
Media criticizes China 
Jakarta Post 
 
 
 
 
Sept 7, 2010 China Accuses Japan of violating Chinese 
sovereignty after Chinese fishing 
vessel and Japanese Coast Guard 
vessel collide; 
Lodges diplomatic protest; 
Threatens to withhold shipments of 
rare earth metals to Japan; 
Demands apology and compensation 
from Japan 
Japan Arrests Chinese fishing crew; 
Charges captain with criminal act; 
Releases captain after two weeks; 
Issues statement dismissing 
China’s demand for an apology as 
“completely groundless and 
utterly unacceptable”  
 
 
 
Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
Mar 3, 2011 China Orders Philippine survey vessel near 
Reed Bank (Spratly Islands) to cease 
activities 
Philippines Lodges formal diplomatic protest; 
Sends Coast Guard vessels to 
protect survey ship; 
Commander of Philippine 
Western Command states, "It's 
clearly our territory. If they bully 
us, well even children will fight 
back." 
Philippines Official 
Gazette: Office of the 
President, 
The Jamestown 
Foundation 
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Date Initiator Action Target(s) Target Reaction Sources 
Mar 7, 2011 China Flies helicopter near Japanese 
destroyer near natural gas field where 
China and Japan claim exploration 
rights 
Japan Calls incident "an extremely 
dangerous act" and notes 
government is working through 
diplomatic channels 
Japan Ministry of 
Defense 
May 21, 2011 China Unloads building supplies near Likas 
and Patag islands on contested 
Iroquois Reef 
Philippines No official government reaction; 
Media criticizes China 
Philippine Star 
May 26, 2011 China Severs exploration cables of 
Vietnamese vessel conducting 
seismic survey 
Vietnam Lodges formal diplomatic protest Vietnam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
June 9, 2011 China Severs exploration cables of 
Vietnamese seismic survey vessel 
Vietnam Lodges formal diplomatic protest; 
Accuses China of "premeditated 
and carefully calculated attack"; 
Announces live fire ammunition 
drills off coast of Quant Nam 
Province on June 10, 2011 
Vietnam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 
BBC 
Aug 21, 2011 China Patrol boats enters 12 nautical mile 
zone around Senkaku Islands 
Japan Lodges formal diplomatic protest; 
Refuses to recognize navigation 
of Chinese vessels as innocent 
passage 
Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
 
 
Feb 19, 2012 China Warns two Japanese Coast Guard 
vessels conducting activities in 
international waters to leave the area 
Japan Lodges diplomatic protest;  
Argues Coast Guard activity was 
legal; 
Calls Chinese action 
“unacceptable" 
BBC 
Feb 22, 2012 China Denies Vietnam fishing vessel right 
to land while seeking refuge from 
storm approaching Paracel Islands 
Vietnam Lodges official protest;  
Foreign Ministry spokesman says 
Chinese action "seriously 
infringed" on Vietnam's 
sovereignty and "gravely 
threatened lives and property" 
 
Vietnam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
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Date Initiator Action Target(s) Target Reaction Sources 
Mar 2, 2012 Japan Names 39 uninhabited islands near 
Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands 
China Criticizes Japan's "unilateral", 
"illegal" and "invalid" action; 
Foreign Ministry issues statement 
maintaining Diaoyu Islands 
belong to China; 
Issues own names and 
descriptions of 70 islands near 
Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands 
 
 
Xinhua, 
Agence France Presse 
Mar 23, 2012 China Detains 2 Vietnamese fishing vessels 
and 21 Vietnamese fishermen near 
Paracel Islands 
Vietnam Asks China to immediately and 
unconditionally release all 
fishermen;  
Lodges official diplomatic protest 
 
 
Vietnam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
 
 
Apr 10, 2012 China Sends 8 fishing vessels to disputed 
Scarborough Shoal;  
Sends surveillance ships and warns 
Philippine Navy to leave the area 
Philippines Deploys largest warship to 
Scarborough Shoal;  
Searches Chinese vessels, finds 
illegal catches; 
Accuses China of serious 
violation of Philippines 
sovereignty and maritime 
jurisdiction; 
Presents official position on 
Scarborough Shoal and associated 
waters 
Philippines Official 
Gazette: Office of the 
President 
Apr 19, 2012 China Implements "national plan of island 
protection" in South China Sea to 
"strengthen protection and rationalize 
exploration of China's island 
resources"; 
Promotes establishing tourism on 
uninhabited islands 
 
 
Vietnam Submits strongly worded 
statement;  
Says plan violates Vietnamese 
sovereignty;  
Urges China to scrap plan 
Vietnam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
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Date Initiator Action Target(s) Target Reaction Sources 
June 21, 2012 China Unilaterally raises administrative 
status of Xisha, Zhongsha, and 
Nansha islands from county level to 
prefectural level;  
Permits city of Sansha to administer 
the three island groups and their 
surrounding waters; 
Announces plan to establish military 
presence at Sansha 
Philippines,  
Vietnam 
Philippines: 
President rebukes China's move 
in  State of the Union address on 
July  23, 2012;  States, "If 
someone entered your backyard 
and told you he owned it, would 
you agree? Would it be right to 
give away that which is rightfully 
ours?" 
 
Vietnam:  
Sends note of protest to Chinese 
Foreign Ministry; 
Calls development a violation of 
Vietnamese sovereignty and  
 "strongly opposes" establishment 
of Sansha City. 
Philippines Official 
Gazette: Office of the 
President, 
Vietnam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
July 13, 2012 China Pressures Cambodia at ASEAN 
summit to keep Code of Conduct and 
territorial issues off the table;  
Insists settling territorial disputes is a 
bilateral matter between individual 
nations 
Philippines,  
Vietnam 
Philippines: 
Issues statement deploring 
ASEAN non-issuance of joint 
communique  
 
Vietnam: 
Issues statement expressing regret 
over failure to issue joint 
communique 
 
United States: 
Issues statement criticizing 
China's "divide and conquer" 
strategy 
 
 
 
 
Philippines Department 
of Foreign Affairs, 
Vietnam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 
U.S. State Department 
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Date Initiator Action Target(s) Target Reaction Sources 
Sept 11, 2012 Japan Purchases Senkaku / Diaoyu  Islands 
from private Japanese owner 
China Issues official statement saying 
China will not be "subject to 
bullying and humiliation from 
others"; 
States it will not back down on 
territorial issues following 
nationalization of the islands; 
States, "The Chinese government 
will not sit idly by watching its 
territorial sovereignty being 
infringed upon.” 
Chinese Government 
Official Web Portal 
Nov 1, 2012 China Issues new passports with a map 
depicting the entirety of the South 
China Sea belonging to China 
Philippines,  
Vietnam 
Philippines: 
Refuses to stamp new passports; 
Stamps a separately issued visa; 
Reasserts position that 9-dash line  
is inconsistent with international  
law 
 
Vietnam: 
Issues diplomatic protest; 
Says action violates Vietnamese   
sovereignty; 
Refuses to stamp to new passport,  
stamps separately issued visa 
Philippines Department 
of Foreign Affairs, 
Vietnam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Nov 28, 2012 China Extends authority to Hainan province 
police to search, board "territory 
violating" vessels 
Philippines,  
Vietnam 
Philippines: 
Releases statement, calls action 
"gross violation" of international   
law; 
Says new law deserves  
international condemnation 
 
Vietnam: 
Issues diplomatic protest; 
Says action violates Vietnamese   
sovereignty 
Philippines Government 
Archives: Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 
Vietnam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
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Date Initiator Action Target(s) Target Reaction Sources 
Nov 30, 2012 China Severs seismic survey cables of 
Vietnamese ship near Con Co Island 
(same ship that had cables cut in May 
2011) 
Vietnam Lodges diplomatic protest; 
Urges all countries to abide by the 
U.N. Convention on Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) 
Vietnam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Dec 13, 2012 China Flies maritime surveillance aircraft 
near Senkaku Islands into Japanese 
airspace; 
Four State Oceanic vessels enter 
Japanese territorial waters on same 
day; 
Two additional incidents occur (Dec 
22, 24) in which Chinese aircraft fly 
within Japan's Air Defense 
Identification Zone, though not into 
Japanese airspace 
 
 
Japan Scrambles F-15 fighter jets on 
each occasion; 
Lodges formal diplomatic protest 
Japan Ministry of 
Defense 
Jan 12, 2013 China Flies maritime surveillance aircraft 
near Senkaku Islands into Japanese 
airspace; 
Three additional incidents occur in 
Jan 2013 
 
 
Japan Scrambles F-15 fighter jets on 
each occasion; 
Considers authorizing Air Force 
to fire warning shots at Chinese 
planes entering Japanese airspace 
 
Japan Ministry of 
Defense 
Jan 19, 2013 China Directs fire control radar (used for 
weapons targeting) at Japanese 
Maritime Self Defense Forces 
helicopter 
Japan Lodges diplomatic protest; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs says 
China not in line with the facts of 
the matter; 
Advocates Maritime 
Communication Mechanism 
between Japan and China defense 
authorities 
 
 
 
Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 
Japan Ministry of 
Defense 
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Sources: Agence France Presse, Asia Times, BBC, Chinese Government Official Web Portal, Jakarta Post, Jamestown 
Foundation, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan Ministry of Defense, Philippine Star, Philippines Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Philippines Government Archives: Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines Official Gazette: Office of the President, 
Philippines Official Gazette: Department of Foreign Affairs, U.S. State Department, Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Xinhua. 
 
 
Date Initiator Action Target(s) Target Reaction Sources 
Jan 30, 2013 China Directs fire control radar at Japanese 
Maritime Self Defense Forces 
destroyer 
Japan Lodges diplomatic protest; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs says 
China not in line with the facts of 
the matter; 
Advocates Maritime 
Communication Mechanism 
between Japan and China defense 
authorities 
Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 
Japan Ministry of 
Defense 
Mar 13, 2013 China Chases two Vietnamese fishing 
vessels from disputed waters near 
Paracel Islands 
Vietnam Publicly affirms Vietnam's 
sovereignty over islands; 
States Vietnam is resolutely 
opposed to any infringement on 
its sovereignty 
Vietnam Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
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 A review of the 27 events listed in Table 3 reveals numerous items of interest.  
First, it is important to note that the number of conflict events occurring between China 
and its neighbors has progressively increased over the past several years.  A total of four 
significant conflict events occurred in 2010, followed by six in 2011.  But in 2012 alone, 
the region saw thirteen such events, and in the first three months of 2013, four events 
occurred.  It is apparent that the trend in the occurrence of conflict events is increasing.  
 Second, it is worth noting that a majority of conflict events resulted in highly 
unfavorable official government reactions.  In 24 of the 27 cases, governments of 
targeted nations issued diplomatic protests or strongly worded statements.  Given that a 
majority of the 27 conflict events were initiated by China, the high number of negative 
official responses underscores how seriously and unfavorably nations have reacted to 
China’s recent actions. 
 Additionally, analysis clearly indicates that Chinese actions are primarily directed 
at three nations: Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines.  Although China’s history with 
Japan has undoubtedly been contentious, what is surprising is the degree to which China 
has recently been challenging Japan over claims in the East China Sea.  Between 2000 
and 2009, only eight documented conflict events occurred between the two countries.  
From 2009 to 2013, however, Japan has been the target of Chinese action on at least ten 
occasions, of which four have occurred in the past year alone.  Also surprising, perhaps, 
is the frequency of recent conflict events occurring between China and Vietnam, and 
between China and the Philippines.  China has taken action against Vietnam on eleven 
occasions since 2009, and against the Philippines on seven occasions during the same 
period.  It appears that action taken against China’s other maritime neighbors has been 
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negligible overall.  Research uncovered no instances of conflict between China and 
Malaysia or Brunei, although these nations do have competing territorial claims with 
China in the South China Sea.  China and Taiwan have not had any public disputes over 
territory in the past several years, presumably attributable to the two parties’ attempts to 
build a more congenial relationship.  One notable incident with Indonesia occurred in 
early summer 2010, during which armed Chinese Fisheries Management vessels 
escorting Chinese fishing boats near Indonesian waters seized several Indonesian fishing 
vessels accused of “illegal fishing”.  Interestingly, in this instance China appears to have 
initiated conflict with a nation that has no directly overlapping claims with China.   
 Analysis also indicates that a majority of conflict events took place at the tactical 
level (between lower echelon military units, ships belonging to government civilian 
maritime enforcement agencies, and/or civilian fishing and survey vessels).  Twenty of 
the 27 events involved the use of aircraft and/or ships on the seas.   The other seven 
events occurred at the strategic level, involving decisions made at the highest levels of 
government.  Notably, all seven of these strategic level events have occurred in the past 
year alone.  The Japanese government’s decision to name uninhabited islands and to 
nationalize the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands are two of these events.  In both instances, it 
was determined that Japan was the initiator.  The other five strategic-level conflict events 
were initiated by the Chinese government.  China’s implementation of a national plan of 
island protection in the South China Sea, its unilateral decision to raise the administrative 
status of Sansha prefecture in the South China Sea, its alleged role in preventing the 
signing of a joint communiqué at ASEAN’s 45th regional summit, its decision to issue 
passports with maps depicting China’s claims to territory in the South China Sea, and its 
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granting of authority to Hainan Province police to search and board vessels determined to 
be violating Chinese territory all took place between April and December of 2012.  
Clearly the trend in conflict events occurring at the strategic level is upward. 
 Moreover, analysis indicates that conflict events involving the use of military 
assets are occurring more frequently.  Whereas in the past China and its neighbors have 
primarily relied on civilian assets to address the disputes, in the past year alone (March 
2012 to March 2013), there have been five instances in which nations used military assets 
to initiate or respond to provocative action.  These include the Philippines use of its 
largest naval vessel to respond to the standoff at Scarborough Shoal, Japan’s responding 
to Chinese reconnaissance flights by sending F-15 fighter jets to intercept Chinese 
aircraft, and China’s use of ship-borne target tracking radar against Japanese naval and 
air assets.  This recent, deliberate use of tactical military hardware contrasts with just one 
prior event involving the use of such forces, which occurred in 2010 when China 
conducted an unannounced anti-submarine warfare exercise near Japanese waters.   
 As mentioned earlier, two events were identified in which China appeared not to 
be the initiator, and in which China was apparently targeted by the action.  These events 
include the March 2012 incident in which Japan named 39 uninhabited islands in 
contested waters near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, and the September 2012 incident in 
which the Japanese government purchased the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands from their 
private Japanese owner.  In both cases Japan argues that the islands have historically 
belonged to Japan, and that the actions taken were legitimate.  Additionally, Japan argues 
that its actions were taken in response to China boosting the number of its maritime 
patrols in the region.  In any event, because Japan took these actions in contested waters 
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during a period of heightened tensions, and because the actions were out of the ordinary, 
it seemed appropriate to identify Japan as the initiator in these instances.    
 
Evidence of Bullying Behavior 
 What do the findings of the conflict event analysis suggest about China bullying 
its maritime neighbors?  Before answering this question, it is worth briefly reviewing 
what we know about bullying behavior.  First, we have seen that in order for bullying 
behavior to occur, a power imbalance of some kind must exist between the aggressor and 
the victim.  Additionally, we know that bullying entails threats or the actual use of 
violence, and that the aggressor desires to enhance power and inflict harm.  We have also 
learned that bullying behavior is aggressive, repetitive, committed intentionally, includes 
acts of coercion and intimidation, that the actions committed are harmful, unprovoked, 
and unjustified, and that the aggressor derives a sense of gratification from his actions.  
Similarly, we have learned that victims, or targets, of aggression may be either passive or 
provocative in their response, and that they may seek intervention by an authority 
(someone more powerful than the perpetrator) to redress the existing power imbalance.  It 
has been established that victims interpret the action directed against them as oppressive, 
and importantly, it has been shown that the victim’s perception is a highly significant 
factor in determining whether bullying is occurring.  Addressing evidence of both bully 
behavior and victim behavior in the context of China’s interaction with its maritime 
neighbors is essential for determining whether China has bullied its neighbors.   
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Power Imbalance 
 Before examining what conflict event data suggests about China bullying its 
neighbors, it is important to recognize that a precondition for bullying behavior (i.e. the 
existence of a power imbalance between parties) does exist.  It is well established that 
China is East Asia’s largest nation both in terms of geography and population.  More 
importantly, however, China outmatches its neighbors in terms of both military capacity 
and economic strength.  China currently maintains East Asia’s largest military force, and 
it ranks third in the world in terms of overall conventional military capability.
176
  Among 
China’s maritime neighbors, South Korea is the next most militarily capable nation, 
ranking eighth overall in the world, though South Korea’s military capacity remains 
dwarfed by that of China.
177
  China’s other maritime neighbors clearly come nowhere 
close to matching Chinese military strength.  Military power world rankings for these 
nations are as follows: Indonesia (15th), Japan (17th), Taiwan (18th), Vietnam (25th), the 
Philippines (31st), Malaysia (33rd).
178
  Likewise, China’s economy is now East Asia’s 
largest, and is the world’s second largest.179  China certainly has the economic capacity to 
fund continued growth of its defense establishment.  Moreover, China is able to leverage 
its economic strength to apply pressure to other nations in the region.  Clearly a power 
imbalance exists between China and its neighbors.  With this power imbalance in mind, it 
is possible to sift through the data to determine whether evidence exists of China bullying 
its maritime neighbors.       
Threatening Behavior and the Use of Violence 
 The analytical findings indicate that China has engaged in threatening behavior.  
This has certainly been observed at the tactical level.  Chinese maritime enforcement 
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vessels have warned foreign vessels to cease their activities and to stay out of “Chinese” 
waters.  Likewise, China has participated in unannounced and unusual passage of sizable 
naval flotillas close to neighboring states, it has used helicopters to fly within close 
proximity of foreign maritime vessels, it has conducted incursions of its neighbors’ 
airspace, and it has used weapons-targeting radar against other nations’ ships and 
airborne assets. Each of these actions can certainly be, and in fact have been, interpreted 
as threatening.   
 Threatening behavior has also been observed at the strategic level.  Chinese 
national authorities granting the government of Hainan province the authority to stop and 
search foreign vessels transiting international waters is certainly a bold move, and it has 
been interpreted as threatening not only by China’s maritime neighbors, but by all nations 
whose vessels transit the South China Sea.  With respect to the July 2012 ASEAN 
conference, China’s interference with the regional institution’s efforts to reach an 
agreement governing conduct in the South China Sea has torpedoed hopes for a swift 
resolution to the claims issue and can certainly be regarded as a threat to ASEAN.  
Another example of intimidating or threatening behavior at the strategic level includes 
the issuing of passports with a map depicting a non-internationally recognized maritime 
boundary around disputed waters.  Similarly, nations have interpreted as threatening 
China’s unilateral decision to elevate the administrative status of a small island city, 
granting it authority to govern over a widely contested maritime area, and simultaneously 
establishing a military presence on the island.  In each instance, China has exhibited bold 
behavior that can reasonably be interpreted as intimidating.  In fact, some scholars argue 
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that actions such as these are indicative of expansionist intensions and, as such, are 
inherently threatening.
180
   
 Furthermore, although it appears China, in recent years, has not engaged in any 
actions that might be considered “violent”, it can certainly be argued that actions such as 
warning foreign vessels against conducting surveys and ordering them to cease their 
activities in internationally recognized waters, chasing vessels out of disputed waters, 
detaining ships and their crews, causing physical damage to equipment being towed by 
foreign vessels, and deliberately conducting maneuvers in other nations’ territorial waters 
and airspace are examples of intimidating and inappropriate behavior.  Such behavior 
certainly meets the criteria for bullying behavior.   
Intentional and Repetitive Behavior 
   In instances where it has been determined that China initiated action against 
specific targets, the actions appear to have been committed intentionally.  Examples of 
actions committed intentionally include: the three cable severing incidents committed 
against Vietnamese survey vessels, the unloading of supplies on disputed islands with the 
intent of building permanent structures, denying Vietnamese sailors the right to land and 
seek refuge during a storm, detaining foreign vessels and their crews, and promoting 
tourism to uninhabited, disputed islands.  There is no mistaking that such incidents are 
done with intent and are sanctioned by the Chinese government.  Moreover, the sheer 
number of times China has taken action against its neighbors over the past several years 
calls attention to the fact that this type of behavior has been repetitive.  Further still, the 
number of China-initiated conflict events having occurred in 2012 represents a twofold 
increase over the number of events that occurred in 2011.  This underscores how already 
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repetitive behavior is becoming even more frequent.  The repetitiveness and frequency 
with which China is taking action against its neighbors is indicative of the bully behavior 
cycle that was described in Chapter 3.  China’s desire for power promotes its willingness 
to inflict harm on its neighbors.  This, in turn, leads to aggressive action being taken.  As 
China perceives that its actions are producing the desired results, its desire for power is 
reinforced and increases, and so the cycle continues.  By establishing a greater physical 
presence in the South China Sea, for instance, and by issuing unilateral pronouncements 
claiming that the entire region is China’s sovereign territory, China believes it is 
expanding its span of control throughout the region.  As China perceives its power in the 
region is increasing as a result of its assertiveness, the stage is set for further aggressive 
action.  Overall, the repetitive nature and increasing frequency with which China is 
engaging in aggressive behavior against its neighbors points to evidence of bullying 
behavior.  Additionally, the intimidating nature and repetitiveness of Chinese actions 
against its neighbors suggest that China is engaging in a specific form of bullying 
behavior referred to as “strategic bullying”.  Strategic bullying, a type of behavior 
outlined by Dennis Lines and introduced in Chapter 3, is characterized by a continual, 
systematic abuse of power.  The abuse does not occur as a single time, impulsive event, 
but is a pre-planned and continual act of harassment in which the bully puts down a 
weaker subject.
181
  A review of the 25 events in which China was determined to be the 
initiator certainly suggests that strategic bullying is precisely the type of behavior China 
has engaged in. 
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Unprovoked/Unjustified Behavior 
 Determining whether China’s actions were completely unprovoked and 
unjustified is a matter that is much more controversial.  China has always argued that its 
actions are justified based on history, and that it is merely responding in a tit-for-tat 
manner to protect what it claims is its rightful territory.
182
  In fact, Chinese leaders have 
accused other nations of bullying China.  For example, in responding to the September 
2012 Japanese nationalization of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese government 
released an official statement affirming that China “will not be subject to bullying and 
humiliation from others”.183  Indeed in the case of Japanese nationalization of the 
Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands, China has a legitimate point, and in the analysis of conflict 
events, Japan was designated the initiator in this instance.  Nonetheless, the analysis of 
recent conflict events between China and its maritime neighbors reveals that in 25 of 27 
recent instances, China deliberately initiated action against other nations who appear to 
have done little at all to provoke their larger, more powerful neighbor.  In fact, it could be 
argued that in each of these instances, rather than being provoked, China itself acted in a 
provocative manner.  Examples of provocative Chinese action include deliberately 
cutting the cables being towed by seismic survey research vessels, hastily establishing 
new prefectures and unilaterally granting them jurisdiction over disputed territories, 
unilaterally declaring sovereignty over disputed territories and distributing government-
endorsed maps with territorial boundaries unrecognized by the international community, 
and claiming the right to search and seize vessels operating in waters traditionally 
recognized as part of the international domain.  Clearly, such actions can be interpreted as 
provocative and meet the definition of bullying behavior. 
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 It is also worth noting that China’s actions appear to be centered around denying 
its neighbors a choice in shaping the future of territorial claims in the region.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the more powerful party’s attempts to create an absence of choice 
for the victim is a tell-tale sign of bullying behavior.  This is what appears to be occurring 
in the South China Sea.  China’s actions indicate that it is pressing full speed ahead with 
plans to establish its influence in the region.  It seems that China is focused on a strategy 
of shaping the geopolitical reality of the region before its neighbors have an opportunity 
to react in any meaningful way.  If China moves quickly enough, it may succeed in 
achieving a veritable fait accompli, claiming enough territory to more forcefully defend 
its position to the international community.  For example, China’s encouraging tourism of 
uninhabited islands, raising the administrative status of Sansha Island, granting the 
Hainan Island provincial authority the right to stop and inspect foreign vessels, and 
increasing the number of maritime patrols in the region is all done absent the choice of 
China’s neighbors.  Likewise, denying its neighbors the ability to hammer out an 
agreement concerning conduct on the seas by interfering with ASEAN’s internal 
processes, also removes the power of choice from China’s neighbors.  What’s more, 
China’s neighbors are virtually powerless to stop China from taking such actions and 
denying them a say in the matter.  In the end, the impacts on China’s neighbors are not 
only physical (in terms of losing control of disputed territory), but they are psychological 
as well.  By acting swiftly to try and deny others a choice in shaping events, Chinese 
actions are clearly frustrating its neighbors.  This frustration is clearly visible in the 
official, and adverse, reactions of neighboring governments.  Taken together, China’s 
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apparent attempts to deny its neighbors a choice suggests that it is engaged in bullying 
behavior.      
Victim Perspective/Response 
 How have China’s maritime neighbors responded to Chinese actions?  This 
question is central to characterizing Chinese behavior as the definition of bullying 
depends largely on how targets, or victims, of the behavior react.  In short, analysis 
indicates that reactions to China’s recent conduct have been overwhelmingly unfavorable.  
Governments of countries with whom China is engaged in ongoing maritime territorial 
disputes have expressed their displeasure via direct diplomatic channels (for example, 
lodging official diplomatic protests with the Chinese government), and they have 
occasionally expressed displeasure by making official public statements through the 
media.  As Table 3 indicates, of the 25 instances in which it was determined that China 
was the initiator, targeted countries lodged official protests with the Chinese government 
on fifteen occasions, and on seven occasions, high ranking government officials and 
spokespersons issued strongly worded statements condemning China’s actions.  For 
example, Japan’s Defense Minister publicly expressed displeasure in April 2010 after 
China sailed a flotilla unannounced through the Miyako Strait near Japan’s southwest 
islands and conducted an anti-submarine warfare exercise.
184
  Japan’s Defense Ministry 
also publicly rebuked China for what it interpreted as “an extremely dangerous act” when 
in March 2011 a Chinese State Oceanic Administration helicopter flew near a Japanese 
destroyer while the destroyer conducted operations near a gas field where both China and 
Japan claim exploration rights.
185
  Another incident that occurred in March 2011, in 
which China and the Philippines engaged in a row over Reed Bank in the Spratly Islands, 
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led to the Philippine Western Command commander publicly chiding China by stating, 
“It’s clearly our territory.  If they bully us, well even children will fight back”.186  After 
China severed exploration cables being towed by Vietnamese survey vessels in May and 
June of 2011, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused China of premeditated 
and carefully calculated attack.
187
  In February 2012, after Chinese Marine Surveillance 
vessels issued warnings to Japanese Coast Guard vessels to leave the area and cease 
conducting surveillance activities in international waters, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary 
responded by calling China’s actions “unacceptable”.188  Later that same month, when 
China denied Vietnamese fishermen the right to land while seeking refuge from a storm 
that was approaching the Paracel Islands, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman 
lamented that China’s actions “seriously infringed” on Vietnamese sovereignty and 
“gravely threatened lives and property”.189  In April 2012, when China implemented its 
“national plan of island protection” in the South China Sea and began to promote tourism 
on uninhabited islands, Vietnam again complained that the action violated Vietnamese 
sovereignty and urged China to scrap the plan.
190
  Finally, when China raised the 
administrative status of key islands in the South China Sea to the prefectural level and 
announced that one of the islands would administer all surrounding waters, the President 
of the Philippines rebuked the move in his State of the Union address, stating, “If 
someone entered your yard and told you he owned it, would you agree?  Would it be right 
to give away that which is rightfully ours?”.191  Clearly China’s neighbors perceive 
Chinese behavior as unjust, inappropriate, and oppressive.   
 Literature on bully theory suggests that victims tend to react to bullying in a 
manner that is either passive, allowing the bully to continue his tormenting unpunished, 
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or provocative, reacting strongly to the bully’s provocative actions.  As Chapter 3 points 
out, whether the victim’s reaction is passive or provocative, bully theory suggests that 
victims are generally ineffective at halting the bullying behavior directed at them.  Does 
conflict event data suggest anything about whether the targets of Chinese actions are 
responding in a way that is either passive or provocative, and whether their reactions are 
effectively dissuading China’s behavior?  Certainly it appears that those targeted by 
Chinese actions are not reacting passively.  In each of the 25 instances in which China 
has initiated action against its neighbors, those neighbors have responded by protesting in 
some manner.  In some instances, displeasure was expressed in more subtle terms.  For 
example, when the 2012 ASEAN summit resulted in ASEAN’s first-ever failure to reach 
an agreement, the Philippines issued a statement deploring the non-issuance of a 
communiqué (source: Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs), and Vietnam publicly 
expressed regret over the failed summit (Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs); neither 
the Philippines nor Vietnam issued an official diplomatic protest over perceived Chinese 
meddling resulting in the failure.  In other instances, target nations’ protests were much 
more pronounced.  For example, in response to China’s actions near the Scarborough 
Shoal in April 2012, the Philippine government not only released its official position on 
the shoal and its associated waters, but it harshly and publicly rebuked China for 
violating Philippine sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction.  Moreover, the Philippines 
sent its largest warship to the shoal to protest Chinese actions there.  Certainly China’s 
neighbors are not responding passively to the actions directed against them.  In fact, it 
could be argued that reactions among China’s neighbors have in some instances bordered 
on provocative victim behavior.  However, in none of the 25 instances does it appear that 
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the reactions of China’s neighbors are having any substantial effect on curbing Chinese 
policy.  Ultimately, China continues to engage in assertive behavior against its neighbors, 
and it appears that its neighbors, at least individually, are virtually powerless to stop it.  
This is just as bully theory would predict: victims, on their own, are generally ineffective 
at stopping bullying from occurring.   
 
Conclusion 
 An analysis of conflict events shows how China’s actions in recent years can 
certainly be perceived by its neighbors as bullying behavior.  A review of the 27 
identified exchanges between China and its neighbors reveals evidence of bullying as 
defined by bully behavior theory.  Such behavior includes: threatening and intimidating 
behavior, unprovoked, unjustified, and harmful actions intentionally directed against 
weaker parties, and the recurrence of such behavior over a prolonged period.  
Furthermore, it is clear that China’s maritime neighbors have not taken kindly to China’s 
policy.  Given that the target/victim perspective weighs heavily in determining whether 
bullying is occurring, and given that the analysis shows how multiple nations have 
lamented the behavior directed against them, it is certainly reasonable to conclude that 
since 2009, and from the perspective of its smaller neighbors, China has engaged in 
bullying.     
 
Media Content and Trend Analysis 
 A review of media reporting on the maritime claims issue reveals that the issue 
has been garnering higher levels of public attention in key claimant states since 2009.  
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This is especially so in China, as Figure 6 illustrates.  The amount of reporting from 
China’s Xinhua news service increased over ten-fold between 2009 and 2012, and the 
raw number of reports in China was the highest among any country in the region in 2012 
(595 reports addressing the issue).  Among China’s neighbors, the increase in reporting 
has been most pronounced in Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.  As Figure 7 
illustrates, in 2012 Japan’s Asahi Shimbun reported on the disputed claims thirty-four 
times more often than it did in 2009.  Data also show that by 2012, the Philippine Star’s 
reporting on the issue had increased more than twenty-fold over 2009 levels.  In Taiwan, 
the Taipei Times addressed the issue seventeen times more often than it had in 2009, and 
in Vietnam, by 2012 news coverage had more than tripled.  It should be mentioned that 
although data were collected for the years 1992 – 2012, Figures 6 and 7 only depict 
results for the period 2007 – 2012.  I elected to trim the period of data displayed in 
Figures 6 and 7 and begin in 2007 primarily as a matter of convenience for viewing the 
data; for each country, year-by-year reporting levels prior to 2007 were comparable to 
the number of reports in 2007.  Likewise, I elected not to display results for some 
countries at all.  The number of media reports for Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South 
Korea were negligible, and plotting the results from these countries would only have 
cluttered Figure 7.   
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Figure 6: Number of Chinese media reports related to maritime territorial disputes 
(Data compiled from Open Source Center: Xinhua news service.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Number of media reports from China’s maritime neighbors, related to maritime 
territorial disputes 
(Data compiled from Open Source Center: Philippine Star, Vietnam News Agency, Asahi 
Shimbun, and Taipei Times.) 
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Media Reporting in China  
 An analysis of Chinese media reports reveals that the Chinese press has been 
highly critical of China’s maritime neighbors in recent years.  Of the 988 media reports 
analyzed for the period 2007-2012, on average 60% portray the actions of outside nations 
in a negative context.  Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, in particular, have been the 
subjects of condemning news articles, although the United States has also been the 
recipient of a fair amount of criticism.  The percentage of reports pointing a critical finger 
at other nations has fluctuated year-by-year since 2007.  In 2008 and 2011, for example, 
relatively low percentages of negative reporting was observed, while in 2009, 2010, and 
2012, substantial spikes were witnessed in the percentage of chastising reports.  The high 
percentage of negative reports in 2012 seems particularly significant given that the total 
number of reports for that year jumped dramatically to nearly 600 (a six-fold increase 
from 2011).   
 
Table 4: Number and percentage of Chinese media reports critical of China’s neighbors 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Reports / 
Average Percent 
Number of 
Reports 
41 42 58 143 109 595 988 
Percent Critical 
of Neighbors 
49% 23% 57% 62% 30% 70% 60% 
 
 
 Media reports disseminated by China’s official news agency, Xinhua, have 
several fascinating characteristics.  First, unlike what is observed in the media of certain 
neighboring nations, there is absolutely no questioning of Chinese government policy on 
the territorial claims.  No opposing views on policy are expressed, and no sympathy is 
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offered for the other claimants.  The impression one is left with is that China is convinced 
of the rightness of its position on the disputes.  Given that Xinhua is a direct extension of 
the Chinese government, such one-sided reporting is not entirely surprising.  Second, 
Chinese media reports refer frequently to China’s official stance on questions of 
sovereignty.  Examples include a report published in September 2012, in which Chinese 
representatives reiterate China’s position on the Diaoyu Islands to Japan,192 and another 
published in April 2012, in which a background paper provides “basic facts on Chinese 
sovereignty over Huangyan Island”.193  Moreover, the topic of China’s right to maritime 
territory is addressed in absolute terms.  Chinese press reports often refer to China’s 
“indisputable sovereignty” and its legal right to administer areas that in fact remain 
heavily disputed.  China has touted its “indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel 
Islands”,194 its “indisputable sovereignty” over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands,195 and its 
“indisputable right” to gas exploration in the East China Sea.196  Such language indicates 
the degree to which Chinese officials are absolutely convinced of the rightness of their 
claims.  Third, there is an unmistakable pattern of Chinese media honing in on specific 
incidents in which China and other nations butt heads over territorial matters.  Ample, 
perhaps excessive, media coverage is then dedicated to these incidents.  For example, 
Japan’s purchase of the Senakaku / Diaoyu Islands in September 2012 triggered a deluge 
of media reports in which Japan was repeatedly and harshly criticized.  Articles and 
columns routinely leveled accusations, such as Japan’s “theft” of the islands197 and of 
Japan “forsaking pacific principles”.198  When China was embroiled in a tense dispute 
with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal in the spring of 2012, similar accusations 
were made.  Articles chastising the Philippines for its “illegal claims”,199 and warnings 
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issued to the Philippine government not to “exacerbate tensions” in the South China 
Sea
200
 were regularly published.  Fourth, there are numerous instances in which Chinese 
media attempt to demonstrate that China has international support for its position and 
policy.  A number of articles mention how international scholars from various corners of 
the globe (for example, Kenya,
201
 Belgium,
202
 Germany,
203
 Spain,
204
 and Austria
205
 argue 
that China’s position is steeped in international law and is completely legitimate.  
Likewise, reports about Chinese communities around the world publicly supporting 
China’s position often are present.  Articles discuss demonstrations among Chinese 
supporters living in Los Angeles,
206
 Houston,
207
 Canada,
208
 Angola,
209
 and Indonesia,
210
 
for example.  Finally, a number of reports address China’s insistence that territorial 
matters be handled only by those nations directly involved in the disputes, and that 
outside nations should remain distanced.  China accuses the U.S. specifically of 
“meddling” in the region’s maritime affairs, and laments how such outside interference is 
“detrimental to Asia-Pacific peace”.211 
Evidence of Bullying Behavior 
 Do Chinese media reports reveal any evidence of bullying behavior on China’s 
part?  A thorough examination of the reports shows that some do contain certain 
characteristics that can be linked to bullying.  The message that China appears to be 
sending in some articles can certainly be interpreted as threatening in nature.  For 
example, a report concerning China sending an “advanced” patrol ship to monitor the 
situation in the South China Sea after China’s standoff with the Philippines over the 
Scarborough Shoal appears to send an ominous message to the Philippine government.
212
  
Another article, which states “Maritime Authority says PRC to stop Japan’s illegal survey 
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activities” suggests a certain degree of threat directed at Japan.213  Yet another, 
explaining that the “PRC sends patrol ship to East China Sea on bid to guard territorial 
rights”214 could be interpreted as an attempt to intimidate other nations in the region.  
And a threat is certainly implied in a report that warns other nations of “due consequence 
if they make serious strategic miscalculations in the South China Sea”.215  Although 
China in no instance advocates the use of violence against its neighbors or any other 
nation as a method of settling the disputes, the tone conveyed in these articles is 
unmistakably stern and can certainly be interpreted as threatening.  However, other 
reports in which China criticizes its neighbors use language that is less intimidating.  
Articles such as those that “urge” the Philippines not to escalate tensions,216 that “ask” 
Japan to stop causing new disturbances,
217
 and that say the U.S. “should” cease stoking 
tensions
218
 might be insulting and patronizing, but it is difficult to argue that such 
language is threatening.   
 As previously mentioned, media reporting reflects that China takes an inflexible 
position when it comes to territorial disputes.  Reports of how China “vows absolutely no 
concession” on the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands issue219 and how China “never accepts 
Japan’s ‘control’ of waters” near the Islands220 suggest a certain obstinacy and absolutism 
that might be interpreted as threatening.  Maintaining its position while rejecting any 
possibility of compromise implies that China may be willing to resort to extreme 
measures if its neighbors push their agendas too hard.  However, it may be a stretch to 
conclude that such apparent inflexibility necessarily signals threatening behavior. 
 Without question, China’s criticism of its maritime neighbors and other nations is 
done intentionally and is highly repetitive.  The stream of insults directed at Japan, the 
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Philippines, and Vietnam is consistent throughout the timeframe analyzed.  Certainly 
there is a concerted effort among Chinese leaders to point the finger at these nations and 
accuse them of causing all the trouble that has occurred in the East and South China Seas.  
Moreover, the oftentimes harsh language that is used to describe these nations’ actions 
(e.g. accusations of engaging in “banditry”,221 and charges of acting with “duplicity”222) 
is harmful.  As theory on bullying behavior makes clear, bullying involves behavior that 
is harmful, intentional, and repetitive in nature.  The harmful words used in Chinese 
media reports and the intentional and repetitive manner in which the reports are 
disseminated suggest that bullying may be occurring.   
 We have also learned that bullying behavior is often driven by attempts to hide 
inadequacy and avoid responsibility for behavior and its effects.
223
  Indeed, there are 
instances in which Chinese media reports reflect attempts by China to avoid 
responsibility.  For example, every time China “urges” its neighbors not to cause trouble, 
or implores them not to deliberately create disputes in the East or South China Seas, 
China absolves itself of all responsibility and shifts responsibility to other parties.  In 
China’s view, it is clearly always the other party that is at fault for existing tension.  Such 
unwillingness to accept any responsibility for the numerous quarrels that have occurred 
supports the notion that China is engaging in bullying behavior.   
 Finally, an analysis of Chinese media reports suggests that China is engaging in a 
particular type of bullying behavior, discussed in Chapter 3, known as “bullying for 
approval”.  This type of behavior is characterized by engaging in bullying as a means to 
increase one’s popularity, or to win self-approval.224  The very one-sided reporting that 
China disseminates is meant not only to signal to outside nations what China’s position is 
 97 
 
on the territorial disputes, but is meant for audiences inside China’s borders.  Indeed, it 
seems that a primary purpose of the reporting is to shape domestic attitudes on the issue.  
In essence, it appears that China’s leaders are using their control of the media to win the 
Chinese public’s approval for their actions.  Shaping public attitudes and securing public 
approval is certainly consistent with China’s core interest of protecting and maintaining 
the current system of government.  Doing so permits the Chinese Communist Party to 
derive public support for its actions and helps the Party maintain legitimacy.  Reports in 
which China vows never to give concession on disputed territories,
225
 frequent reporting 
about Chinese maritime vessels patrolling disputed waters to fight illegal exploration,
226
 
harsh language used to describe the acts of other nations, and frequent calls for other 
nations to respect China’s indisputable sovereignty all project an image of strength and of 
a government protecting the interests of its citizens.  Hence, it certainly appears that the 
concept of bullying for approval applies.   
 
Media Reporting in Neighboring Countries 
 Content analysis of media reports originating in Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, 
and Vietnam shows that a significant proportion of the reporting from each country tends 
to paint China in a less than favorable context.  Chinese policy concerning disputed 
territory was regularly criticized, and neighboring nations often lamented Chinese actions 
on the seas.  Somewhat surprising, however, was that in some instances, the articles 
published took an introspective approach, questioning whether home-government policy 
on the territorial disputes has been appropriate.   
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Japanese Media Reporting 
 Of the 272 Japanese media reports analyzed, approximately 57% express anger, 
irritation, frustration, or concern over Chinese policy and cast China in a negative context.  
Significantly, the vast majority of negative reporting occurred between 2010 and 2012, 
with the highest number (136 reports) published in 2012.   
 
Table 5: Number and percentage of Japanese media reports critical of China 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Reports / 
Average Percent 
Number of 
Reports 
5 6 4 79 42 136 272 
Percent Critical 
of China 
40% 33% 25% 68% 49% 54% 57% 
 
 
 One recurring theme of Japanese media reports concerns Chinese violations of 
Japanese territorial waters and airspace.  Reporting includes allegations of Chinese ships 
“illegally” entering Japan’s maritime territory.227  Some reports even argue that China has 
elevated the disputes to a new level by expanding territorial violations beyond the seas 
and into the air above the seas.
228
  In all such reports, China is depicted as the aggressor.  
Other reports, too, make it clear who the finger is being pointed at.  Japanese reporting is 
replete with accusations of China acting like a “spoiled child”229 and of China engaging 
in “provocative acts”.230  China’s acts are characterized as “unacceptable”,231 references 
are made about “Beijing’s maritime aggression”,232 and Chinese policy is labeled as 
“hard-line and counterproductive”.233  Moreover, reports sometimes lament how China 
has handled the disputes issue poorly.  For example, one article accuses a “newly 
assertive China” of condoning island-landing stunts by Chinese activists,234 another 
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report suggests that PRC patrol boats spotted near Japanese islands is “demonstrative 
behavior”,235 another claims that China is far from being a sensible power with respect to 
handling island disputes,
236
 and yet another accuses China of acting “outrageously”.237  In 
some instances, even more colorful language is used to portray China as an aggressor.  
For example, one column refers to China as a bird of prey “spreading its talons” against 
Japan in the Senkaku dispute,
238
 and another recommends that Japan must “keep a close 
eye on what the bully will do”.239    
 Although a majority of the reports published tend to level criticism at China, a 
good number of them take a more moderate approach to addressing the disputes.  These 
articles address the ongoing disputes with China, but they do not portray China in such a 
negative context.  For example, reports addressing plans by Southeast Asian nations to 
unite for talks with China in no way point a finger at China.
240
  Likewise, articles 
addressing how experts from Japan and China have made calls to establish a private 
sector forum to resolve the Senkakus dispute,
241
 and of the Chinese Embassy’s attempts 
to thaw ties with Japan
242
 certainly do not assign blame to China.  Some articles penned 
by Japanese editors even discuss what Japan’s role should be to ensure that the disputes 
are resolved peacefully, and in some instances, articles appear to point the finger at 
Japanese leaders for poor policy regarding the disputes.  For example, themes that often 
arise include the need for Japan to seek careful diplomacy with China over the Senkakus 
dispute,
243
 the utility of pursuing a calm approach to resolving the matter,
244
 and the 
necessity of pursuing “wise diplomacy”.245  Some reports offer alternative solutions that 
Japan might pursue, to include taking the dispute to the International Court of Justice.
246
  
Other reports suggest that Japanese politicians should work to defuse the disputes and not 
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exacerbate them,
247
 that the “provocative” acts of some Japanese politicians must be met 
with a mature response,
248
 and that territorial flare-ups should be handled with “cool 
professionalism”.249 
Media Reporting in the Philippines 
 Of the 327 relevant Philippine media reports analyzed for the period 2007 – 2012, 
approximately 46% portray China as the party responsible for an increase in tensions.  
Perhaps significantly, in 2012 (the year in which the highest number of reports were 
published), an even higher percentage (54%) painted China in unfavorable terms.   
 
 
Table 6: Number and percentage of Philippine media reports critical of China 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Reports / 
Average Percent 
Number of 
Reports 
4 14 8 8 127 166 327 
Percent Critical 
of China 
0% 8% 77% 25% 39% 54% 46% 
 
 
 A number of reports express displeasure over many of China’s policies in the 
South China Sea.  For example, articles address irritation over Chinese maps depicting 
disputed territory as belonging to China,
250
 some object to Chinese patrols in disputed 
areas,
251
 and others express anger over Chinese passports depicting the South China Sea 
as Chinese territory.
252
  Several articles describe Chinese “muscle-flexing” as disruptive 
and resulting in undesirable outcomes such as the ASEAN 2012 debacle.
253
  Resentment 
is also expressed over Chinese plans to bring tourists to the South China Sea,
254
 and some 
reports reiterate the Philippines’ “exclusive right” to explore and exploit the South China 
Sea.
255
  The language used in many reports clearly expresses the Philippine attitude that 
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China’s behavior is in many respects abrasive.  For example, China is urged to stop its 
“provocative acts”,256 China is charged with “tightening its grip” on the Spratly 
Islands,
257
 and China is accused of “incursions”258 and  “intrusions”259 into Philippine 
territory.  Likewise, reports bemoan China’s “imperialistic” behavior,260 its “harassment” 
of research ships,
261
 its attempts to “deprive” the Philippines of sea resources,262 and its 
intention “to grab” Philippine territory.263  Moreover, some reports suggest that China is a 
nation that cannot be trusted.  An article discussing how the  Reed Bank incident of 2011 
“belies Chinese reassurances of peaceful rise”264 and paints China as a nefarious actor.  
Further still, some reports depict China as a nation with behavioral problems.  China must 
“learn the ways of neighborly behavior” according to one article,265 China shows its true 
nature as a “neighborhood bully” according to another,266 and on several occasions, 
China is explicitly referred to as a bully in the Spratly Islands region.
267
 
 As with Japanese media reporting, many Philippine reports treat the disputes issue 
objectively and do not assign blame to China in any way at all.  For example, one report 
proposes an information-sharing system to monitor the disputed waters and to avoid 
confrontation,
268
 and other discuss how the Philippines wants a peaceful settlement to its 
disputes with China.
269
  Similar to some Japanese reports, certain Philippine articles take 
an introspective look at Philippine behavior.  For example, one column airs concern over 
what is viewed as the Philippines’ “confrontational diplomacy” with China.270  Another 
report disapproves of Philippine President Aquino’s move to rename part of the South 
China Sea, stating that such policy simply is “adding fuel to the conflict”,271 and yet 
another article warns against the Philippines making “war noises” over the Spratlys 
dispute with China.
272
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Vietnamese Media Reporting 
 As a percentage of overall reporting, Vietnam takes the harshest stance toward 
China.  Of the 184 reports analyzed from the Vietnam News Agency, approximately 66% 
portray China in an unfavorable context.   
 
Table 7: Number and percentage of Vietnamese media reports critical of China 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Reports / 
Average Percent 
Number of 
Reports 
6 9 19 27 58 65 184 
Percent Critical 
of China 
43% 50% 80% 66% 64% 68% 66% 
 
 One recurring theme concerns anger over new Chinese maps depicting the 
entirety of the South China Sea as belonging to China.  In particular, a number of articles 
express exasperation over China’s issuance of passports with the controversial maps 
printed on them.
273
  Reports argue that such claims on China’s part are “totally illegal”.274  
Other recurring themes include frustration over China’s unilateral declarations of fishing 
bans,
275
 of China seizing Vietnamese fishing vessels,
276
 and of China’s maltreatment of 
Vietnamese fishermen.
277
  Vietnam has complained about China’s plans for tourism in 
the Paracels,
278
 reports have raised concern about the development of uninhabited 
islands,
279
 and numerous articles affirm Vietnam’s sovereignty over portions of the South 
China Sea.
280
  Overall, the language used by the Vietnamese press is not as colorful or as 
biting as some of the language found in the Philippine and Japanese media, but the 
number of complaints leveled against China is certainly larger in percentage terms. 
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 Not all Vietnamese media reports point a finger at China, and some address the 
maritime disputes in terms that tend to be more moderate.  More benign reports tend to 
flaunt Vietnam’s commitment to UNCLOS,281 its support of an ASEAN-endorsed Code 
of Conduct for the South China Sea,
282
 Vietnam’s desire to resolve the disputes 
peacefully,
283
 and its desire to bring peace and security to the region.
284
  Occasional, 
more upbeat reporting discusses Vietnam and China reaching consensus on resolving the 
South China Sea disputes peacefully.
285
  Interestingly, unlike the Japanese and Philippine 
cases, the list of Vietnamese media reports contain no reports questioning Vietnamese 
leadership’s policy on the disputes.  Such a lack of introspection or self-criticism is not 
surprising given that the Vietnamese News Agency is a state-run media organization.     
 
Media Reporting in Taiwan 
 Reports originating from Taiwan are generally easier on China than those 
originating from Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.  Overall, the tone of reporting is 
less harsh.  Moreover, fewer reports (as an overall percentage of reporting) portray China 
in an unfavorable context.  Of the 111 Taiwanese reports analyzed, only 31% tend to 
point a finger at China for the problems occurring in the South and East China Seas.   
 
Table 8: Number and percentage of Taiwanese media reports critical of China 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Reports / 
Average Percent 
Number of 
Reports 
2 8 4 5 22 70 111 
Percent Critical 
of China 
0% 0% 25% 20% 25% 36% 31% 
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 Those articles that do portray China in negative terms express concern over 
China’s potentially hawkish stance,286 discontent over China’s new passports,287 and 
uneasiness over China’s plans to invest massive amounts of funding into building 
infrastructure on islands in disputed territory.
288
  Some reports urge that China exercise 
restraint and respect internationally-recognized freedoms of navigation in the South 
China Sea,
289
 while other reports discuss the need for China to earn respect and not throw 
fuel on the fire of growing tensions in the South China Sea.
290
  Other reports express 
concerns related to China’s increasing maritime surveillance capabilities, its threatening 
of Japan, its detaining of Vietnamese fishermen, and its claim to the South China Sea in 
its entirety.
291
  Taken together, however, the concerns expressed in the Taiwanese media 
are done in a manner that is much less accusatory than what is observed in Japanese, 
Philippine, and Vietnamese media.  
 
 It was determined earlier, through an analysis of specific conflict events, that 
China’s neighbors are expressing their displeasure through official government channels.  
But indications of unfavorable reactions to China’s maritime policy do not stop at 
statements from government officials.  Media analysis also reveals that Chinese conduct 
is generally perceived by the public to be unjust and inappropriate.  But to what extent 
does the content and trend analysis of media reports from sources outside China provide 
evidence that China is bullying its neighbors?  The findings certainly suggest that China’s 
neighbors perceive themselves to be victims.  First, it is evident from the sheer volume of 
reports painting China as an aggressor that China’s neighbors are upset with its behavior.  
It certainly cannot go unnoticed that one out of every two reports in Japan and the 
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Philippines, and two out of every three reports in Vietnam, portray China in an 
unfavorable context.  Moreover, considering that the number of reports in each country 
has increased substantially in recent years, these results are even more striking.  Although 
the percentage of negative reports originating from the Taiwanese press is lower than that 
of other countries, it is still significant that one out of every three Taiwanese media 
reports discusses China’s maritime policy in an unfavorable context.  Clearly, such high 
numbers reflect a sense of being subjected to wrongful treatment at the hands of China. 
 Second, the language used in a number of reports to describe China’s policy 
reflects a sense of having been victimized.  The choice of language varies by country.  In 
some instances, the language is quite pointed, even biting.  In other instances, the 
language is more subtle, but nonetheless condemning.  Unhappy and dissatisfied attitudes 
are captured in words such as “illegal” and “imperialistic” (in describing China’s activity).  
Likewise, referring to “Beijing’s aggression”, China’s “muscle-flexing”, its “hard-line 
and counterproductive” stance and “demonstrative behavior”, and directly labeling China 
a “bully” all illustrate how China’s policy is being interpreted as oppressive by its 
neighbors.  The use of such language in media reports indicates that, at least to some 
degree, China is perceived to be a threat to stability and an aggressor inappropriately and 
unjustly pursuing its agenda.     
 Moreover, media reports providing open criticism of China’s behavior reflect 
evidence of non-passive victim behavior.  Those opposed to China’s policy are choosing 
not to remain silent in their opposition.  In fact, it could be argued that in some instances, 
the harshness of tone expressed through the reporting and the use of specific language 
might be indicative of a provocative victim response.  Referring to China as a “spoiled 
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child” and inferring that China is some kind of beast ready to “spread its talons” supports 
the notion that the response is at times provocative.  Whether or not these types of 
responses should be interpreted as provocative, arguments made via the media criticizing 
China’s maritime policy and characterizing Chinese behavior clearly reveal a sense 
among China’s neighbors of having been victimized.  Reports such as those that accuse 
China of dividing ASEAN over the South China Sea,
292
 that complain about Chinese 
unilateral enforcement of fishing bans in waters claimed by other nations,
293
 and that 
decry Chinese violations of sovereign airspace
294
 indicate a prevailing sense of being 
unjustly targeted by inappropriate and aggressive Chinese action.  Such perceptions on 
the part of China’s neighbors support the assertion that China has engaged in bullying 
behavior.   
 
Conclusion 
 In sum, media content and trend analysis illustrates that disputes over maritime 
territory have become increasingly contentious since 2009, at a point when China is 
known to have implemented a more assertive foreign policy.  The substantial increase in 
reporting both in China and among neighboring claimant states demonstrates that the 
issue is high in the minds of the region’s public.  Moreover, a general increase in the 
number of reports in which China and its neighbors paint each other in a negative context 
suggests that the issue is becoming increasingly contentious.  As with conflict event 
analysis, a review of media content demonstrates why China is perceived by its neighbors 
as a bully.  Characteristics of bullying behavior consistently surface in Chinese media 
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reports, and characteristics of victim behavior are manifest in a number of media reports 
disseminated by China’s neighbors.   
 
Figure 8: Editorial cartoons depicting China as a bully 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Philippine Star, March 8, 
2011. “Editorial: Peaceful rise?” 
Source: The Philippine Star, March 18, 
2009. “China Must ‘Learn the Ways of 
Neighborly Behavior’ to Earn Respect”. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
 The purpose of this thesis was to analyze Chinese activity in East Asia’s disputed 
maritime regions in order to interpret China’s conduct from the perspective of smaller 
states.  In doing so, three specific questions were asked:  Is China bullying its maritime 
neighbors?; What are the benefits and costs for China of behaving like a bully?; and, 
What is the impact of Chinese behavior for the East Asia region?  Conflict event analysis, 
as well as media content and trend analysis, demonstrate why China’s smaller, less 
powerful neighbors believe China has engaged in bullying behavior.  A close 
examination of how China has interacted with other parties to the disputes reveals key 
characteristics of bullying behavior.  China has engaged in intentional, repetitive, 
intimidating, and harmful behavior.  Evidence suggests that such behavior has been 
committed by the Chinese government in an attempt to derive power and enhance its 
position in the region.  Some evidence suggests that such behavior has been committed, 
at least in part, to seek approval from a domestic audience.  China has not yet taken 
violent action against its neighbors, but its increasingly assertive conduct in recent years 
has raised concern across the region that violence may eventually ensue.  Furthermore, 
and importantly, evidence illustrates that China’s behavior is perceived by its neighbors 
to be oppressive, unjust, and inappropriate. 
 Naturally, the view from the Chinese side of the debate differs dramatically.  
China dismisses the allegation that it has bullied its neighbors.  From its perspective, the 
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country has simply exercised its rightful claims to territory that has always belonged to 
China.  For others to judge China’s behavior as bullying is unjust and represents a gross 
misreading of history.  To be fair, China has endured historic injustice at the hands of 
more powerful nations.  But whether such treatment excuses China’s current behavior is 
debatable.   
 It is prudent to at least briefly examine China’s behavior from the perspective of 
an aspiring state.  Such an examination is important for arriving at a final assessment of 
China’s behavior.  Realist theory posits that all states within the international system act 
rationally, pursue their self-interests, and that the primary concern of all states is survival.  
China is no exception in this regard, and there is no doubt that Chinese leaders justify 
their actions as necessary for ensuring national survival.  From China’s perspective, its 
policy in the East and South China Seas is not a matter of pushing around other nations 
simply because it can.  Rather, it is about establishing conditions for sustained economic 
growth and social development, one of China’s three core interests.  In addition, as 
economic growth enhances China’s national power, Chinese leaders are able to advance 
China’s other core interests: protecting national sovereignty and sustaining the current 
political establishment (i.e. maintaining the ruling status of the Chinese Communist 
Party).  Consequently, Chinese leaders, mindful of the need to establish conditions for 
continued economic growth, act with little regard for how other nations perceive their 
actions.   
 One might justify China’s behavior by arguing that it has simply conducted itself 
in a manner that is typical of aspiring powers.  As nations grow more powerful and 
influential, their actions are bound to eventually be interpreted by less powerful states as 
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intrusive, and perhaps even as unjust and oppressive.  In some instances, this can result in 
conflict.  Does this mean that aspiring states should be penalized for endeavoring to 
advance their position in the international hierarchy and for trying to improve the quality 
of life for their peoples?  Perhaps the answer lies in the methods aspiring powers use to 
advance their interests.  China appears to have made a conscious decision in 2009 to 
replace a policy of non-confrontational pragmatism with a much more assertive, arguably 
abrasive approach to foreign policy.  Analysis suggests that this new policy has certainly 
contributed to the increased tensions that now afflict the East and South China Seas.  The 
method China has chosen to advance its interests has attracted a great deal of enmity 
within the region, and it is therefore reasonable to question whether the approach has 
been suitable. 
 Two lines of thought might explain China’s behavior in its role as an aspiring 
state.  Balance of power theory and power transition theory both accept the notion that 
nations act rationally, but they differ in their explanation of the onset of conflict.  
(Balance of power theorists submit that a wide discrepancy in the balance of power 
results in conflict, whereas power transition theorists argue that a more equal distribution 
of power leads to conflict.)  Curiously, both theories might explain China’s behavior in 
East Asia’s maritime regions.  China’s emergence as the region’s dominant power has 
provided its leaders incentive to pursue their nation’s interests without having to account 
for the concerns of other nations in the region.  In essence, given that the balance of 
power in the region has shifted to China’s favor, Chinese leaders are empowered to 
pursue their interests as they see fit, even if their actions risk increasing tensions and the 
potential for conflict.  This is just as balance of power theory would predict.  At the same 
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time that balance of power theory might explain the recent increase in regional tensions, 
the power transition theory may explain what is happening on a more global scale.  There 
is no denying that China views the United States as its chief competitor and potential 
adversary.  Although China clearly still trails the U.S. in terms of military power and 
power projection capability, its economic power  is quickly reaching parity with the U.S.  
(According to some estimates, China’s economic capacity is set to surpass that of the U.S. 
as early as 2018.)
295
  Chinese leaders may have calculated that increased economic 
strength places China in a position to challenge the U.S. as the world’s dominant power.  
As Organski and Kugler’s power transition model reveals, when aspiring powers reach 
economic parity with dominant nations, they begin to challenge those nations and the 
potential for conflict increases.  To be clear, there is currently no hard evidence that 
China aspires to replace the U.S. as the world’s dominant power.  But as we have seen, 
the process of challenging the dominant power can occur gradually, long before the 
critical inflection point at which a power shift occurs.
296
  It is reasonable to conclude that 
China is using the maritime disputes as a proxy for challenging the United States.  
Conflict event analysis and content and trend analysis of Chinese media reporting 
supports such a claim.  By challenging its regional neighbors (some of whom are U.S. 
allies), China is able to indirectly defy U.S. global dominance.   
 Whether or not China’s behavior is justified on the grounds that it is simply acting 
in a manner that is typical of aspiring powers, evidence clearly indicates why China’s 
neighbors accuse it of acting like a bully.  Moreover, although China’s conduct is driven 
by its national interests, its more assertive approach in the East and South China Seas has 
certainly contributed to the recent, elevated tensions with other claimant states. 
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Consequences of China’s Behavior 
 Chapter 3 outlined some of the benefits as well as costs that are generally 
associated with bullying behavior.  It was discussed that benefits of bullying include 
enhanced social prominence, peer leadership, perceived popularity, and respect; the 
ability to acquire material resources in a competitive environment; and, the ability to 
achieve goals through aggressive acts.  Costs of bullying can include judicial punishment, 
isolation, and being targeted for revenge by victims.   
 Chinese leaders may have calculated that acting assertively provides the 
government and the Chinese Communist Party an opportunity to enhance its image.  By 
taking a strong stand on the matter of territorial claims, and by refusing to budge in spite 
of hefty criticism from abroad, the government is able to project strength, build 
legitimacy, and elicit support from its citizens.  Projecting strength and building 
legitimacy is especially important in light of the numerous domestic challenges China’s 
leaders currently face (e.g. public anger over political corruption, economic inequality, 
environmental pollution).  Hence, an assertive policy in the East and South China Seas is 
beneficial for Chinese leaders in that it permits them to shape the public discourse and 
divert attention away from internal matters that could potentially destabilize the current 
establishment. 
 At the same time that China might be benefitting at home by portraying itself as 
strong, it is evident that China’s behavior strains and jeopardizes its relations with other 
nations.  As the research indicates, it appears that Chinese policy in the East and South 
China Seas has contributed to an erosion of trust between China and others in the region.  
Such mistrust, in turn, could ultimately upend China’s ability to advance its core interests 
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over the long term.  That China’s actions could result in unfavorable consequences for 
China itself is not too surprising.  As Chapter 3 explained, research on bullying suggests 
that the behavior is ultimately self-defeating and self-destructive; parties that engage in 
aggressive, harmful actions against others ultimately harm themselves.   
 While conflict event analysis was most useful for identifying evidence of bullying 
behavior, media content and trend analysis provides some specific examples of how 
perceived bullying might be costly for China.  Analysis suggests that the ongoing 
disputes have had a detrimental impact on economic relations between China and 
neighboring nations.  In Japan, for example, articles express concern about how the 
ongoing Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands dispute is affecting negotiations for a free trade 
agreement with China.
297
  Concerns are also expressed over how Chinese tourism to 
Japan has suffered as a result of the ongoing row.
298
  In China too, articles examine the 
detrimental economic consequences of increased tensions with Japan.  By late 2012, a 
number of articles were published addressing the negative impacts on China-Japan 
tourism,
299
 shrinking Japanese auto sales in China (and the impacts to Chinese dealers),
300
 
and concerns over how soured relations with Japan have taken a toll on trade ties in 
general.
301
  In fact, some press reports cite concerns of Chinese store managers who 
lament that the hit to sales of Japanese products does no good for anyone.
302
  It is 
uncertain whether the adverse economic impacts addressed in the media are indicative of 
possible larger economic troubles to come; the adverse economic consequences 
encountered thus far may be isolated and short-lived.  However, such consequences are 
nonetheless harmful and represent how the disputes have real and unwelcome 
consequences for all those in the region. 
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 Perhaps a more significant consequence, and one that could be more costly for 
China, is that nations within the East Asia region appear to be allying with one another 
and strengthening partnerships with nations from outside the region in an apparent 
attempt to counterbalance a perceived threat from China.  Media reports in Japan, the 
Philippines, and Vietnam certainly suggest that these nations are more actively seeking 
cooperation with other states in the region, and that they are developing stronger ties with 
the United States.  Japanese media discuss more active cooperation between Japan and 
the U.S. on military drills, including island landing campaigns.
303
  Japan is also 
reportedly boosting ties with ASEAN over wariness of China.
304
  Likewise, attention has 
been given to recent first-ever joint military drills conducted by Japan, the U.S., and 
Australia in the South China Sea.
305
  Japan is also strengthening ties with Indonesia; in 
2011 the two countries agreed to annual meetings amid rising tensions in the East and 
South China Seas.
306
  In the Philippines, media reports indicate that the Philippines and 
Canada recently signed a memorandum of understanding on defense procurement.
307
  In 
addition, the Philippines and Australia have vowed to strengthen defense relations
308
 and 
reports discuss how in 2010, the Philippines and Vietnam signed a defense cooperation 
agreement.
309
  In Vietnam, the Vietnam News Agency has published a number of reports 
on discussions between Vietnam and other nations concerning the need to deal with 
regional security challenges (i.e. mitigate the threat posed by China).  Articles discuss, 
for example, how Vietnamese and Japanese scholars have met to discuss regional 
security issues and have stepped-up cooperation between the two nations.
310
  Measures 
are reportedly being taken to increase cooperation with Malaysia
311
 and the Philippines
312
 
as well.  Reports even suggest that tensions with China over the South China Sea are 
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resulting in warming relations between Vietnam and the United States.  Columns 
describe how Vietnam and the U.S. have asserted the need to maintain freedom of 
navigation in the South China Sea,
313
 and the U.S. has even been referred to in the 
Vietnamese press as a “leading partner of strategic importance”.314  Clearly, such 
agreements on maritime security matters come as a result of perceived Chinese 
aggression, and these agreements may provide convenient leverage for nations in the 
event of future conflict with China.  In addition, and as the research shows, strong 
reactions from China’s neighbors and challenges to perceived Chinese aggression have 
been the norm.  In some instances, reactions have moved well beyond diplomatic protests 
and media statements expressing displeasure.  For example, beginning in December 2012, 
Japan has reacted to Chinese sea and air patrols near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands by 
directing Coast Guard vessels and military fighter aircraft to intercept Chinese ships and 
aircraft operating in the vicinity.
315
  Japan is also responding by boosting its military 
presence in the region.  Plans are in the works, for example, to build a new military 
installation on Yonaguni Island, merely 80 miles from the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands.
316
  
Developments such as these certainly illustrate how bullying behavior can be costly for 
China.  Moreover, such developments raise some level of concern for the future of the 
region.  The apparent aligning against China and a perceptibly more active role for 
military elements in responding to the disputes poses risks for regional peace and stability 
in the months and years ahead. 
 China’s perceived bullying behavior may also be adversely impacting regional 
stability in that it is fueling public animosity in China as well as abroad.  At home, 
Chinese media reports have fostered anger that occasionally results in violent mass 
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demonstrations.  The most recent example of this was the demonstrations against Japan 
that broke out in the Fall of 2012 as the Chinese media ratcheted up its reporting of 
Japan’s purchase of the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands.  These demonstrations resulted in 
significant damage to Japanese businesses and property in China.  It appears that China is 
playing off of nationalist sentiment to advance its cause.  Indeed, it has been suggested 
that as socialism’s influence over Chinese politics wanes, nationalism acts as the new 
preferred glue; the Chinese government uses nationalistic issues such as sovereignty over 
the South China Sea and portions of the East China Sea as a way to reassert itself.
317
  
Media analysis illustrates how the Chinese government has engaged in inciting 
nationalism to push its agenda on the disputed claims issue.  This is underscored by the 
noticeable spike in the number of Chinese news reports dedicated to the territorial claims 
issue, and the degree to which these reports champion the Chinese position while 
portraying China’s neighbors in a highly negative context.  By consistently and 
frequently feeding the public such one-sided information, the government generates 
disenchantment and focuses public anger on neighboring nations and other members of 
the international community, including the United States.  The problem with this policy, 
however, is that the forces of nationalism are often unpredictable, and its consequences 
can be quite harmful even for those who would use it for their own purposes.  Every time 
China stirs up nationalist sentiment, it runs the risk of igniting a situation that may grow 
beyond its control.  Likewise, it risks not being able to meet the expectations of the 
Chinese public and runs the risk of painting itself as weak and incompetent.  In the wake 
of the 2012 anti-Japanese protests, for example, some demonstrators expressed 
dissatisfaction with the Chinese government for not having done enough to punish Japan.  
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Some protestors even accused the Chinese government of being weak.  As one 
demonstrator put it, “When other countries insult the United States, America strikes back 
with force.  But when China is actually attacked…all we do is insult the attacker.  I’m 
ashamed to be Chinese”.318  Clearly nationalism is a double-edged sword.  If the Chinese 
government does not exercise caution, uncontrolled nationalist sentiment could force the 
government to act in ways it might not prefer, to include using military force against its 
neighbors.  Such actions would be profoundly detrimental for East Asian peace and 
stability.    
 Animosity abroad has been stoked by China’s conduct on the seas.  In Japan, for 
example, a poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in June 2012 revealed that 84% of 
Japanese citizens had a negative view of China.
319
  (Such results concur with results of 
the Gallup poll referenced in Chapter 1.)  Moreover, by late 2012, interest for the 
Japanese Coast Guard had surged to new heights as the disputes over the Senkaku / 
Diaoyu Islands intensified and young Japanese began applying for positions with the 
agency.
320
  Further, certain Japanese groups and members of government have called for 
beefing up Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to respond to Chinese conduct,321 and indeed 
Japanese leaders appear to be responding to such calls by publicly considering using 
Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to protect Japan’s territorial waters against Chinese 
incursions.
322
  Philippine and Vietnamese media, too, warn of looming militarism in the 
region,
323
 and government leaders have been contemplating upgrading their militaries to 
meet the perceived Chinese threat.
324
  It is difficult to determine whether such reactions 
necessarily hint at intensified conflict looming on the horizon, or whether public 
animosity and the associated pressure placed on governments will eventually subside.  
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What is certain is that China’s policy sows the seeds of discontent and mistrust among its 
neighbors and among the Chinese people, and this certainly does not contribute to East 
Asian security and stability.   
Limitations of Study 
 All academic studies have their limitations, and this one is certainly no exception.  
The conclusions arrived at in this study might be challenged in several ways.  For 
example, it is possible that the full range of interaction between the parties in dispute was 
not captured.  If this is true, the analysis would inherently be flawed, at least to some 
degree.  It is possible that in some instances, informal arrangements were made between 
parties that were not made visible to outside observers.  It is well known that nations 
negotiate behind the scenes, occasionally threatening each other, extending olive 
branches, or searching for middle ground.  It might very well be the case, for example, 
that nations who appear to be neutral on the territorial disputes, or whose criticism toward 
China is muted, are actually much more upset with China than their public statements 
suggest.  The desire to maintain constructive relations with China might dissuade nations 
from publicizing existing tensions.  The converse might also be true.  Nations who 
publicly chastise China might be more willing to cooperate with Chinese leaders behind 
the scenes.  In either case, a lack of complete information on official government 
positions may skew the results of the analysis.  The only conceivable way to circumvent 
this issue would be to employ less-traditional data collection methods, such as the use of 
investigative journalism techniques or intelligence collection. 
 The conclusions of this study might also be challenged in that the study does not 
include a thorough historical analysis of territorial claims within the region.  Such an 
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analysis was not included as it would have been beyond the scope of the study.  However, 
a better understanding of the historical claims to key territories may have provided a 
proper context for more accurately interpreting the data. 
 The findings of the media content and trend analysis might be disputed in that 
only a single newspaper from each country was selected from which to draw data.  
Admittedly, noting the number and tone of articles published by a single news source 
might not be the most accurate approach for drawing conclusions on an admittedly 
complex issue.  However, given that the most popular news source from each country 
was selected, the method still provides a window for examining, at least to a fair degree, 
how the issue is perceived by the public. 
 One might argue that the study unfairly singles out China, painting it as an 
instigator and irresponsible actor in its relations with other nations.  To reiterate, the 
intent of this thesis was to explore China’s behavior from the perspective of smaller, 
weaker states, and to use the ongoing disputes over territory between China and its 
neighbors as a case environment for examining how smaller states perceive the actions of 
aspiring ones.  The intent was not to single out or assign blame to any particular nation. 
 Finally, although the study was carried out with a mind toward objective data 
collection and analysis, exercising subjectivity was at times unavoidable.  For example, 
identifying the initiator of a conflict event and the target of the action required exercising 
a degree of subjectivity.  Likewise, identifying relevant media reports and gauging the 
tone expressed in the reports required some subjective decision-making.  Devising a more 
scientific approach for identifying and interpreting media reports might enhance 
objectivity in the research process.  In addition, linking China’s actions with the 
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consequences of those actions was a process that left room for interpretation.  One 
method that might help establish a link between China’s actions and consequences would 
be to conduct a public survey each month within nations neighboring China.  Questions 
could be designed to capture views about specific events and how these events impact 
attitudes toward China.   
 In spite of these limitations, I am confident that any objective-minded researcher 
would be able to use my methodology to reproduce the same or very similar results to 
those I have generated in this study.  Moreover, I am confident that the same 
methodology could be applied to other nations and circumstances to determine whether 
bullying is occurring at the international level.    
 
Future Research 
 The nature of China’s interaction with its maritime neighbors has undoubtedly 
been contentious in recent years.  A bold approach to foreign policy has left many of 
China’s neighbors uneasy about the prospects for long-term peace and stability in the 
region.  Yet it is difficult at this stage to ascertain how China’s relationship with its 
maritime neighbors will play out.  As a nation that has historically secluded itself from 
the rest of world, an ascendant China flexing its geopolitical muscles is a relatively new 
phenomenon.  Among the great “unknowns” is whether China’s new leaders, having 
taken office within the past year, will continue to pursue the assertive policy of their 
predecessors with respect to the maritime claims issue.  Future research, using the 
techniques employed in this study, may help answer this question.  Tracking conflict 
events and media trends throughout 2013 and beyond should provide indications of 
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whether China has toned down its approach, or whether the assertive trend continues.  
 Moreover, China is currently experiencing a rapid shift in its social landscape as 
its economy continues to boom.  How this ultimately impacts China’s foreign policy in 
the region remains to be seen.  Well-designed studies that examine China’s social 
transformation and relations with neighboring nations (especially in the context of bully 
behavior theory) might be helpful for predicting future Chinese foreign policy.   
 Furthermore, this study focused on disputes between China and its maritime 
neighbors.  Follow-on research, employing the same methodology, might be useful for 
determining whether the approach China is pursuing in the East and South China Seas is 
also being pursued in its interaction with land-bordering nations such as India, Laos, 
Myanmar, Russia, and Mongolia.  Do these nations perceive China as a bully too, and if 
so, what are the potential consequences?  Ultimately, such research might help determine 
whether China’s policy in the East and South China Seas is isolated to that region, or 
whether it is part of a larger, more general foreign policy. 
 Finally, future research might include applying the model proposed in this thesis 
to other instances in which smaller states accuse larger ones of bullying them.  This thesis 
applied bully theory to state-level interaction in one specific case, and assessed how 
smaller states react when confronted with the bold policy of an aspiring state.  A broader 
application of this model might offer some insight into the effectiveness of small state 
responses when their interests conflict with those of rising powers, and some important 
conclusions might be drawn about whether bullying theory is truly applicable at the 
international level.  This, in turn, might even open the door to research on whether states, 
like individuals, experience emotions that stem from a perceived sense of being bullied.   
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Final Assessment 
            Since March of this year, when China’s new president Xi Jinping took power, a 
period of relative calm seems to have settled over East Asia’s maritime regions.   
Although none of the claimants has modified its position on maritime claims, and 
although no real progress has been made on addressing the underlying issues that feed the 
disputes, no major incidents of conflict between China and its neighbors have occurred in 
recent months.  Whether this trend will continue is questionable.  It is likely that China’s 
new leaders, early in their tenure, have decided to temporarily dial down the level of 
assertiveness in China's maritime policy.  However, if past trends are any indication of 
future events, the region is likely to encounter choppy waters before too long.  It must be 
said that historical grievances, persistent mistrust among neighbors, nationalist sentiment, 
and disputes over maritime territory have bedeviled the East Asia region for 
decades.  Assigning blame to any one nation for the region’s enduring volatility would be 
unfair, as all claimants have contributed to the tensions that persist.   
 Insofar as China’s recent conduct and the reactions of its neighbors in the East 
and South China Seas is concerned, it is clear that little is happening to mitigate existing 
tensions.  China continues to grow and continues to pursue a policy that serves its core 
interests, but its maritime neighbors perceive that policy as disruptive.  These small states 
continue to perceive themselves as victims of unfair treatment and accuse China of being 
a bully, even though China considers its actions as appropriate based on history and 
national interest.  Unfortunately, the friction between great power conduct and smaller 
state perceptions and reactions appears to have harmful consequences for all those 
involved.  Without question, both great powers and smaller states contribute to that 
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friction.  However, as states accumulate power and enhance their ability to shape 
relationships and outcomes, perhaps they incur a responsibility to more carefully consider 
the positions of smaller states.  The challenge, it seems, is for great and aspiring powers 
like China to find a proper balance between exercising bold leadership and implementing 
policy in a way that mollifies the fears of weaker members of the international 
community.    
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